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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts occasionally fail to appreciate the genius of their
own law. The early Washington cases on lesser included
offenses, for example, formed a complex and subtle doctrine-
the clash and exacting balance of competing interests lying just
below the surface of apparently simple standards. Recent
cases, however, present a flat and awkward version of the doc-
trine. They uniformly ignore, misunderstand, and misapply
the early law under the influence of a relatively recent formu-
lation of the governing standard1 that is inadequate in almost
every respect.
This Article attempts to bring the early cases back to life,
to uncover the origins and deeper logic of the doctrine, and to
re-introduce the older, elegant solutions to the doctrine's cen-
tral problems back into current practice. This Article is not,
however, a simple restoration project. Rather, with regard to
the first part of State v. Workman's2 two-pronged standard,
this Article explores the innate wisdom of the classic elements
test and a failed attempt to supplant it-then proposes chang-
ing it. This change involves a minor and little-recognized vari-
ation on the classic test that, if expanded with due regard to
the root constitutional and strategic concerns of the doctrine,
significantly clarifies and strengthens it. With regard to the
second prong, this Article proposes a wholesale replacement of
the current formulation on the ground that it is fundamentally
flawed. This proposed replacement is firmly based on a close
and careful reading of the early cases that brings to light, for
the first time in decades, the true nature and purpose of the
inquiry.
These are ambitious goals, but neither the importance nor
the complexity of the doctrine of lesser included offenses can
* Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Pierce County, Washington. A.B. 1981,
Washington University in St. Louis; J.D. 1984, Cornell Law School.
1. See State v. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978).
2. Id.
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be overstated. The doctrine permits either the defense or the
prosecution in a criminal case to obtain a jury instruction on an
offense not charged in the indictment or information. At first
glance, the doctrine seems odd. Ordinarily, a defendant is not
permitted to choose the offense for which he will be tried.4
Nor is the prosecution ordinarily permitted to obtain a convic-
tion without giving the defendant notice from the outset of the
offense he is accused of committing.5
The mystery largely dissipates, however, when the gov-
erning rule is stated. Under the leading case of State v. Work-
man,6 a lesser offense is a lesser included offense if two
conditions are met. First, each element of the lesser offense
must be a necessary element of the greater offense. Second,
the evidence in the case must support an inference that the
lesser crime was committed.7 "Put another way, if it is possi-
ble to commit the greater offense without having committed
the lesser offense, the latter is not an included crime."'
It is not surprising, then, that either the defense or the
prosecution should be permitted to use the doctrine to obtain
an instruction on an offense not charged. The jury may be
instructed on a lesser included offense because that accusation
is implicit in the offense that has been charged. The defendant
necessarily has had notice of, and has defended against, the
elements of the lesser offense in the course of the trial of the
greater offense. This is true by definition: under Workman,
3. The doctrine of lesser included offenses was established by the legislature of
Washington Territory in 1854. Wash. Terr. § 123, at 120 (1854). As now codified, the
statute provides as follows: "In all other cases the defendant may be found guilty of an
offense the commission of which is necessarily included within that with which he is
charged in the indictment or information." WASH. REV. CODE § 10.61.006 (1989). The
language "all other cases" refers to a companion statute, also adopted in 1854, that
permits conviction of any offense which is a lesser degree of the charge against the
defendant. See infra note 168.
4. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (prosecutor enjoys broad
discretion in charging under the equal protection clause); Kennewick v. Fountain, 116
Wash. 2d 189, 802 P.2d 1371 (1991) (same).
5. "It is ancient doctrine of both the common law and of our Constitution that a
defendant cannot be held to answer a charge not contained in the indictment brought
against him. This stricture is based at least in part on the right of the defendant to
notice of the charge brought against him." Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705
(1989) (citations omitted). See also State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d 93, 812 P.2d 86
(1991).
6. 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978).
7. Id. at 447-48, 584 P.2d at 385.
8. State v. Bishop, 90 Wash. 2d 185, 191, 580 P.2d 259, 261 (1978) (quoting State v.
Roybal, 82 Wash. 2d 577, 583, 512 P.2d 718, 721 (1973)).
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all the elements of the lesser offense were necessarily also
included in the charge and trial of the greater offense.9
Even from this elementary account of the doctrine, how-
ever, one senses its complexity. The doctrine of lesser included
offenses, unlike other principles of criminal law, does not sim-
ply protect the rights of one or another of the parties. Rather,
the doctrine serves both sides, providing each a strategic flexi-
bility-a fall-back position-in the trial of a case, while pre-
serving both prosecutorial discretion and the defendant's right
to notice and the opportunity to defend. Properly formulated,
the doctrine not only serves the rights and interests of the
respective parties, but maintains them in an equitable
balance.10
Furthermore, and largely beyond the concerns of the liti-
gants, the doctrine preserves the rationality of jury verdicts
and the integrity of the criminal law. The evidence prong, of
course, forecloses jury speculation by barring verdicts that the
evidence will not support. But on a deeper level, the doctrine
as a whole ensures a close fit between the evidence actually
developed at trial and the offense of which the defendant is
ultimately convicted, regardless of the offense with which he
was originally charged. In a very real sense, the doctrine of
lesser included offenses maintains contact between the crimi-
nal code and the world in which crimes are committed."'
The remarkable thing is that none of the doctrine's depth
or complexity is apparent in the governing standard. The first
prong, especially, is easy to apply. For example, a person is
guilty of first degree perjury if, in an official proceeding, while
9. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 447-48, 584 P.2d at 385. Similarly, as the court stated
in State v. Copeland:
It will be noticed that assault in the second degree does not involve any
particular intent, as does assault in the first degree, and therefore, of course
does not require the charge of any particular intent in the information, as is
necessary in charging assault in the first degree. It seems plain then that, if
we ignore the allegation of this information of the particular intent to kill, we
have a complete and perfect charge of assault in the second degree; because
there is still left in the information a charge of facts constituting assault in the
second degree under the provisions of sec. 2414 above quoted. This view is
supported by the following authorities: Clark v. Territory, 1 Wash. Ter. 68;
White v. Territory, 3 Wash. Ter. 297, 24 Pac. 447; State v. Klein, 19 Wash. 368,
53 Pac. 364.
State v. Copeland, 66 Wash. 243, 246, 119 P. 607, 608 (1911). See also State v. Romano,
41 Wash. 241, 83 P. 1 (1905).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 37-38, 194-96.
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under oath, he makes a materially false statement that he
knows to be false. 2 A person is guilty of false swearing if,
while under oath, he makes a false statement that he knows to
be false.' 3 Because all of the elements of false swearing are
three of the five elements of perjury in the first degree, the
first prong of Workman is met as to false swearing.
The simplicity of the elements test, however, is oddly
deceiving. Once one considers the underlying aims of the doc-
trine, it seems that something more subtle might be needed.
For a time, the Ninth Circuit and other Federal Courts of
Appeals certainly thought so. Their opinions derided the ele-
ments test as mechanistic, artificial, and altogether inadequate
to the task. Those courts, consequently, experimented for a
time with an alternative approach, the "inherent relationship"
test.'4 Section II of this Article will consider that alternative,
its flaws, its ultimate rejection by the United States Supreme
Court, and the Washington courts' flirtations with it, as a dem-
onstration of the hidden virtues of the modest elements test.15
Section III of this Article will show how, in spite of its vir-
tues, the elements test can be improved. This proposal
involves expanding a little-known variation that was originally
formulated as a solution to perhaps the most difficult issue
arising under the elements test. The issue is whether, how,
and why there can be a lesser included offense to an attempt.16
Workman itself was an attempt case, and the court coped bril-
liantly with the problem. It formulated what I will call the
"inherent characteristic" rule. The inherent characteristic rule
involves a very minor modification to the elements test that
solves the attempt problem while faithfully observing the
underlying values and logic of the elements test itself. Because
Workman's rationale for this rule is cryptic, it is valuable in
itself to see what is going on beneath the surface of the
opinion. 7
Ultimately, however, it is important to probe beneath the
surface of Workman because the problem of lesser included
offenses to attempts is but one aspect of a larger issue under
the elements test: the threshold question of what counts as an
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.040(i) (1989).
13. Id. § 9A.72.020(1).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 40-73.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 74-91.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 109-18
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"element." Not surprisingly, the Workman opinion's solution
to the attempts problem illuminates the more general issue.
Section III of this Article, accordingly, proposes expanding the
inherent characteristic rule beyond attempt cases to a general
application.
1 8
Section IV of this Article considers Workman's second
prong: the requirement that the evidence in the case support
an inference that the lesser crime was committed.19 It sounds
like a straightforward sufficiency of the evidence test. It is
not.2 ° What is at issue is not the sufficiency of the evidence,
but a type of preclusion by the evidence that is peculiar to the
doctrine of lesser included offenses.
It is here that the supreme court's incomprehension of its
own rich case law has been most egregious. In at least one
passing reference to preclusion, the Workman opinion indi-
cates that the court still understood the purpose of the evi-
dence prong.2' Unfortunately, the court failed to incorporate
that understanding into its formulation of the governing test.
Workman's reference to evidence that will "support an infer-
ence" that the lesser offense was committed 22 suggests, decep-
tively, that nothing more than sufficiency is at issue. Later
courts have fallen completely under the sway of that sugges-
tion, to the point that they have begun to elaborate the pur-
ported sufficiency standard,23 even while ignoring the most
basic limitations on appellate review of jury determinations.24
The evidence prong, properly understood, has nothing to
do with quantities of evidence.2 Each new case elaborating
the test for sufficiency simply buries the true meaning of the
evidence prong even deeper. Ironically, however, each new
corollary to the specious sufficiency standard, once examined,
18. See infra text accompanying notes 144-64.
19. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448, 584 P.2d at 385.
20. See State v. Pacheco, 107 Wash. 2d 59, 70, 726 P.2d 981, 987 (1986) ("In order
for an instruction to be given there must be evidence to support that instruction, or, as
in the case of a request for an instruction on a lesser included offense, the evidence
must support an inference that the lesser crime was committed."); State v. Parker, 102
Wash. 2d 161, 165, 683 P.2d 189, 192 (1984) ("The evidence in this case supports an
inference that the lesser crime was committed.").
21. "Unlike the cases cited by the State, this is not a case where finding the
elements of the lesser offense is precluded by the evidence at trial." Workman, 90
Wash. 2d at 448, 584 P.2d at 386.
22. Id.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 199-209, 211-18.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 220-23.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 177-98.
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also turns out to be an attempt to capture the special sort of
preclusion to which the evidence prong itself originally
attended. Because those corollaries are corollaries to a false
rule, they are necessarily flawed.26 It makes more sense, obvi-
ously, to restore the original meaning of the evidence prong.
That is the aim of Section IV of this Article."
The sum of these discussions is a formulation of a two-part
standard that ought to replace the standard introduced in
Workman. This Article proposes that an instruction on a
lesser included offense is proper where two conditions are met.
First, a lesser offense is a lesser included offense if each ele-
ment of the lesser offense is either an element or an inherent
characteristic of the greater offense. Second, an instruction on
the lesser included offense may be given only if, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the
instruction, there is some evidence in support of the common
elements of the greater and lesser offenses that does not also
establish the remaining elements of the greater offense.
The purpose of this proposal is to restore subtlety, clarity,
and efficacy to the doctrine of lesser included offenses. As
matters stand, Washington courts are well on their way to
developing a crude and confusing version of what ought to be
an especially elegant part of the criminal law.
II. THE LEGAL PRONG: THE SUPERIORITY AND SUCCESS OF
AN ELEMENTS FORMULA
Two prominent commentators on Washington's criminal
law have recently argued that the elements test represents a
substantial departure from the earliest case law.28 Ferguson
and Fine contend that to determine whether the jury was
properly instructed on a lesser included offense, the courts of
Washington originally examined the language of the informa-
tion rather than the statutes defining the respective offenses.29
From this they conclude that the elements test is a recent
innovation, originating in 1970 with the case of State v. East. °
In a limited sense, they are correct. The statute establishing
the doctrine of lesser included offenses in Washington does not
26. See irkfra text accompanying notes 200-24.
27. See infra text following note 224.
28. ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR. & SETH AARON FINE, 13A WASHINGTON PRACTICE,
CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1991).
29. Id.
30. 3 Wash. App. 128, 474 P.2d 582 (1970).
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prescribe a comparison of elements, and East seems to be the
first case in which the term "offense" in the statute was explic-
itly correlated with a discrete set of statutorily defined
elements.3 1
On the whole, however, Ferguson and Fine are mistaken,
and their mistake is fundamental. The elements test is not
simply a convenient means of applying the doctrine of lesser
included offenses, and it certainly is not a recent innovation.
The elements test is constitutionally required and is clearly
discernible in cases decided long before East. In fact, the test is
a corollary to the Washington Constitution's command that
every criminal defendant be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. 2
A. The Elements Test and the Constitutional Notice
Requirement
In State v. Ackles, ss the first major case on lesser included
offenses, the court overturned a conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon against a defendant who had been charged with
assault with intent to commit murder.' The court acknowl-
edged that the the lesser included offenses statute might apply,
but it held squarely that the doctrine was subject to the consti-
tutional notice requirement:
While it is true that the jury may find a defendant not guilty
of the crime charged, but guilty of an offense of lesser
degree, or of an offense necessarily included within that
charged, it is also true that "accusation must precede convic-
31. The court provided as follows: "The prosecution may rely on the included
offense statute, RCW § 10.61.006, only when all of the elements of the included offense
are necessary elements of the offense charged." Id. at 135, 474 P.2d at 587 (emphasis in
original).
32. The Washington Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him...." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22.
There are other, less significant reasons why Ferguson and Fine are mistaken.
While they are correct in noting that the early courts examined the allegations of the
information, they err in inferring that the courts were not, in doing so, examining the
statutory elements of the respective offenses. In State v. Ackles, 8 Wash. 462, 464, 36
P. 597, 598 (1894), the court demanded that the information state "every fact
constituting an element of the offense charged." If the information must set forth
facts constituting every element of the lesser offense, examining the statute and the
information will yield precisely the same result. Ferguson and Fine's distinction
between the early cases' focus on the information and the recent cases' focus on the
statute is thus, at best, a distinction without a difference.
33. State v. Ackles, 8 Wash. 462, 36 P. 597 (1894).
34. Id. at 462, 36 P. at 598.
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tion," and that no one can legally be convicted of an offense
not properly alleged. The accused, in criminal prosecutions,
has a constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Const. art. 1, sec. 22.
And this can only be made known by setting forth in the
indictment or information every fact constituting an element
of the offense charged. This doctrine is elementary and of
universal application, and is founded on the plainest princi-
ple of justice. 
5
The court concluded that because the information filed
against Ackles did not allege that he had acted without consid-
erable provocation or with a willful, malignant, and abandoned
heart-both elements of the lesser offense-he could not, con-
stitutionally, be convicted of the lesser offense:
At common law an assault with a deadly weapon was a mis-
demeanor only, but, as above intimated, the legislature of
this state has made it a felony, punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary, when perpetrated with intent to inflict
bodily injury, under the circumstances and conditions pre-
scribed by statute. And in order to charge this statutory fel-
ony it was necessary to set forth in the information, not only
that the assault was with a deadly weapon with intent to
inflict bodily injury, but the further fact that it was without
considerable provocation, or that it was the impulse of a will-
ful, abandoned and malignant heart. This was not done in
this instance, and appellant was therefore convicted of, and
sentenced to the penitentiary for, a crime of which he was
not charged, either in the language of the statute or in lan-
guage of similar import.3 6
Thus, Ackles not only applied the elements test; it gave a
rather thorough account of the test's constitutional basis. The
court could not permit the defendant to stand convicted of the
lesser offense because, in view of the legislative history of the
statute, the elements of the lesser missing from the greater in
fact stated the gravamen of the lesser offense. To uphold the
conviction on the lesser offense clearly would have resulted in
upholding a conviction obtained without notice.
From the beginning, then, the question has been whether
every element of the lesser offense is a necessary element of
the greater offense. Constitutionally, the question had to be
35. Id. at 464-65, 36 P. at 598.
36. Id. at 465, 36 P. at 598.
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framed that way. Ackles made it quite clear that the doctrine
of lesser included offenses could not be applied in disregard of
the constitutional notice requirement. A comparison of the
respective offenses' statutory elements was unavoidable given
the court's insistence on notice. The elements test, therefore,
is an elegant response to the constitutional command; it is a
guarantee that, in charging the greater offense, the govern-
ment will give notice, implicit but constitutionally sufficient,
that the defendant also is accused of committing the lesser
offense.
B. The Rise and Fall of the "Inherent Relationship" Test
The elements test performs its constitutional function so
well that one can easily lose sight of its other virtues. There is,
for example, its capacity to guard against jury speculation and
compromise simply by virtue of the fact that it is equally avail-
able to the prosecution and the defense. The doctrine of lesser
included offenses originated as a tool of the prosecution, as a
means of ensuring conviction where the defendant had com-
mitted an offense, but where the evidence did not come in pre-
cisely as expected.17  The defendant's right to such an
instruction has long been established, however, not only as a
matter of equal treatment, but as required by justice. When
faced with a choice between acquittal and conviction of a crime
not quite proved by the evidence, a jury can be expected, if
some sort of wrongdoing is evident, to opt for conviction. The
defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction thus
serves to ensure that the verdict accords with the evidence-a
function usually ascribed to the second prong of the governing
standard, but, in this respect, served equally well by the ele-
ments test.
The elements test also maintains a certain balance of
power between the prosecution and the defense. Whether
either or both sides will request an instruction on a lesser
included offense depends primarily on the strength of the
State's case. If the State believes that the proof of the offense
charged is weak, it might seek an instruction on a lesser
included offense in order to give the jury an option other than
acquittal. If the defendant believes that the proof on the
37. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). See, e.g., Austin v. United States,
382 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
38. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973).
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offense charged is strong, she might seek an instruction on a
lesser included offense in order to give the jury an option other
than convicting as charged. These are strategic options that
are decided upon late in the trial, and the determination dif-
fers from case to case and from lawyer to lawyer. The ele-
ments test itself favors neither side.
While that point may seem obvious, it is not trivial. If we
wish to preserve that sort of symmetry in the doctrine of lesser
included offenses, it makes a great difference how the gov-
erning standard is formulated. The United States Supreme
Court recognized as much when, after several years of conflict
among the circuits, it adopted a uniform federal standard to
govern the question: a two-part test virtually indistinguishable
from Workman 's.9 The history of this controversy in the fed-
eral courts is instructive on the virtues of that approach, con-
sisting as it does of a struggle to establish the elements test
that, until recently, Washington courts have always used.
A form of the elements test was dominant in the federal
courts long before the adoption of the governing federal rule in
1941.40 During the 1970's and 1980's, however, several circuits,
including the Ninth, adopted a standard that differed radically
from the elements test. The District of Columbia Circuit for-
mulated the "inherent relationship" test in United States v.
Whitaker4 ' as follows:
[A] [d]efendant is entitled to invoke Rule 31(c) when a lesser
offense is established by the evidence adduced at trial in
proof of the greater offense, with the caveat that there must
also be an 'inherent' relationship between the greater and
lesser offenses, i.e., they must relate to the protection of the
same interests, and must be so related that in the general
nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably,
proof of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of
39. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 n.8 (1989).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c). In Schmuck, the principal federal case on lesser
included offenses, the Supreme Court wrote the following:
This Court's decision in Stevenson v. United States, reflects the "practically
universal" practice. There, in holding that the defendant in a murder charge
was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction on manslaughter under
the statutory predecessor to Rule 31(c), the Court engaged in a careful
comparison of the statutory elements of murder and manslaughter to
determine if the the latter was a lesser included offense of the former. In
short, the elements approach was settled doctrine at the time of the Rule's
promulgation and for more than two decades thereafter.
Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 720 (citation omitted).
41. 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 16:185
1992] Lesser Included Offenses 195
the showing of the commission of the greater offense.42
The inherent relationship test collapsed the legal and evidence
prongs into a single step turning almost entirely on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support an instruction on the lesser
offense. The fundamental idea that one offense is necessarily
included in the other was reduced to a gloss on the vague
"caveat" that the offenses relate to the same interest. Even
more significant, the idea of necessary inclusion was directed
away from the elements of the offenses toward considering the
proof of each offense. In contrast to the traditional elements
test, then, the inherent relationship test was obdurately
factual.
This emphasis on facts rather than on elements was delib-
erate, explicit, and sometimes strident. The Ninth Circuit
adopted the inherent relationship test in United States v. Sto-
larz,43 an opinion in which the elements test was derided as
"mechanistic."44 The court reiterated its preference in United
States v. Johnson,45 adding the charge of "artificiality":
The mechanical comparison of statutory elements the gov-
ernment invites us to make may be appealing in its promise
of certainty and intellectual purity, but its artificiality is
unresponsive to the underlying purposes of the lesser
included offense doctrine, as is demonstrated by the facts of
this case. To the extent we are concerned that a "jury's
practice will diverge from theory" and a defendant may be
convicted of a crime for which all the elements have not
been proven, it makes no sense to confine our discovery of
lesser included offenses to the barren words of the criminal
code, uninformed by the evidence introduced at trial.46
Worries that the "jury's practice will diverge from theory,"
and that "the barren words of the criminal code" will diverge
from reality, are indeed among the primary concerns of the
doctrine of lesser included offenses.47 The Johnson court, how-
ever, was disingenuous in suggesting that those concerns are
neglected in an elements test. An elements test is invariably
42. Id. at 319.
43. 550 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977).
44. Id. at 491.
45. 637 F.2d 1224, 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 1238 (citation omitted).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38; see also infra text accompanying
notes 195-97.
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paired with an evidence prong,4" and safeguarding the rational-
ity of jury verdicts is the defining purpose of the latter.49 As
we will see, that purpose has sometimes been obscured or
neglected-Washington's experience with Workman being a
prime example.' As a response to that problem, however, the
federal circuits' opting for the inherent relationship standard
was a classic case of choosing shoddy goods to replace a fine
piece of work that ought to have been repaired.
In Johnson, the defendant was accused of striking two vic-
tims with the blunt end and handle of an ax.51 He was charged
with assault resulting in serious bodily injury.52 The defendant
requested an instruction on assault with a dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm.53 The trial court refused on the
ground that the latter offense involved two elements that the
former did not: use of a dangerous weapon and intent to do
bodily harm.' The Ninth Circuit reversed and granted a new
trial, insisting that the facts of the particular case must be
given primary consideration in determining whether an
instruction on a lesser included offense is warranted:55
The government never suggested the possibility that any
weapon other than an ax was employed: Papse so testified,
an ax was introduced into evidence, and the prosecutor made
a point of securing Dr. Haddock's agreement on the record
that the injuries could have been inflicted by an ax wielded
48. In one of the earliest applications of the elements test in federal courts, the
Supreme Court wrote the following:
By section 1035 of the Revised Statutes of the United States it is enacted that
"in all criminal causes the defendant may be found guilty of any offence, the
commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charge in
the indictment, or may be found guilty of an attempt to commit the offense so
charged: Provided, That each attempt be itself a separate offence." Under
this statute the defendant charged in the indictment with the crime of murder
may be found guilty of the lower grade of crime, viz., manslaughter. There
must, of course, be some evidence which tends to bear upon that issue. The
jury would not be justified in finding a verdict of manslaughter if there were
no evidence upon which to base such a finding, and in that event the court
would have the right to instruct the jury to that effect.
Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315 (1896) (citation omitted). See also State v.
Young, 22 Wash. 273, 277, 60 P. 650, 651 (1900).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 177-96.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 199-223.
51. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(f) (1976) (assault resulting in serious bodily injury).
53. Johnson, 637 F.2d at 1234. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976) (assault with a
dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm).
54. Johnson, 637 F.2d at 1234.
55. Id. at 1238.
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in the manner Papse described. The government does not
contend, nor could it reasonably do so, that a long-handled
ax is not a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 113(c). Nor does the government argue Johnson did
not have an "intent to do bodily harm" to Papse, and in our
view, evidence that Johnson did inflict the plethora of inju-
ries Papse sustained would support an inference that John-
son intended bodily harm.5
Because the elements of the lesser offense were in fact
present in the case, the lesser offense was a lesser included
offense under the "inherent relationship" standard.
It seemed so simple. The Ninth Circuit later came to
appreciate a particular difficulty with the inherent relationship
standard, however; a difficulty with constitutional overtones
that was largely concealed in Stolarz and Johnson by the fact
that it was the defendant who had requested the instruction on
a lesser included offense.
As noted above, the principal constitutional constraint on
the doctrine of lesser included offenses is the defendant's right
to notice and an opportunity to defend, while historically the
doctrine of lesser included offenses developed as a tool of the
prosecution to insure against acquittal where the proof did not
come in precisely as expected. There is obviously some
potential for conflict between that historical purpose and the
constitutional constraint. Because, however, the Constitution
takes precedence over any common law rationale, the conflict
actually plays out as an asymmetry in the availability of lesser
included offenses. The defendant, who has the advantage of
being able to waive constitutional restrictions by which the
prosecution must always remain bound, may be able to obtain
a far broader range of lesser included offense instructions than
would ever be available to the government.
The elements test is an elegant remedy for that asymme-
try. What the defendant has a right to notice of is not the facts
of the case, but the State's accusation, the theory by which the
government will weave the facts into criminal liability.5 8
56. Id. at 1234-35.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
58. As the Supreme Court has stated:
[Tihe true test [of the sufficiency of an indictment] is, not whether it might
possibly have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains
element of the offence intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other
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Under an elements test, both sides must justify their requested
instructions on lesser offenses with regard to that accusation
by matching the elements of the crime charged. Because the
lesser offense is thus implicit in the charged crime, the prose-
cution will never obtain an instruction that would violate the
constitutional right to notice: the defendant necessarily will
have had notice of the elements of the lesser offense he is now
accused of having committed. Because the defense is bound by
the same test, its selection of lesser included offenses is no
wider, and the defendant's ability to waive her right to notice
never comes into play. The problem of asymmetry never
arises.
Under the inherent relationship test, however, the asym-
metry is potentially extreme. The government's selection of
lesser offenses is bounded by the terms of its information or
indictment. The defendant's selection of lesser offenses is
bounded only by the more various, more malleable facts of the
case. The Whitaker court imposed the requirement of an
"inherent relationship" between the greater and lesser
offenses primarily as a limitation on the number and kind of
proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record
shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or
conviction.
Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895). See also Hagner v. United States,
285 U.S. 427, 431 (1931).
In State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d 93, 812 P.2d 86 (1991), the Washington Supreme
Court held that the information must state all essential elements of the offense, both
statutory and non-statutory. In so holding, the court stressed that the defendant's abil-
ity to mount a defense is the standard by which the adequacy of charging documents is
measured:
In the case of State v. Leach, we recently stated that "the 'essential elements'
rule requires that a charging document allege facts supporting every element
of the offense, in addition to adequately identifying the crime charged." This
core holding of Leach requires that the defendant be apprised of the elements
of the crime charged and the conduct of the defendant which is alleged to
have constituted that crime. Leach explains that merely reciting the statutory
elements of the crime charged may not be sufficient.
Because statutory language may not necessarily define a charge suffi-
ciently to apprise an accused with reasonable certainty of the nature of
the accusation against that person, to the end that the accused may pre-
pare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prose-
cution for the same offense, mere recitation of the statutory language in
the charging document may be inadequate.
We have recently reiterated that it is sufficient to charge in the language of
the statute if the statute defines the offense with certainty.
Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 98-99, 812 P.2d at 88 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
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lesser included offense instructions a defendant might obtain.5 9
That limitation was rather vague, however, and it was never
intended to restore symmetry in the availability of
instructions.
In fact, the Whitaker court expressly disavowed symmetry
as an objective in lesser included offenses doctrine. Recogniz-
ing that the inherent relationship test destroyed symmetry, the
Whitaker court toyed with the idea of restoring it by fiat. The
court considered imposing a requirement of mutuality, under
which the defendant would be able to obtain only those
instructions on lesser offenses that the prosecution could also
obtain.6° In other words, the defendant's right to waive notice
would be artificially curtailed. The terms of the court's rejec-
tion of mutuality, however, made it clear that that requirement
was never anything more than a straw man for the court's
attack on symmetry as a constraint on lesser included offense
analysis:
We do not consider or determine whether there was the req-
uisite mutuality by the traditional test, i.e., whether the
prosecutor could have rightfully requested the lesser
included offense charge; therefore, whether the defense was
entitled to it on request ....
We can, and do, rest this decision on a different ground,
one which may be of easier applicability in future cases than
making a somewhat hindsight determination that the
defense received adequate notice of an included lesser
offense charge. And that is simply to say that, despite the
patina of antiquity, considerations of justice and good judicial
administration warrant dispensing with mutuality as an
essential prerequisite to the defense's right to a lesser
included offense charge.
The defense ought not to be restricted by the stringent
constitutional limits upon the prosecutor's right.
61
In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit indicated that it, too, was
more than ready to abandon symmetry. The court rejected
mutuality as an unwarranted restriction on its "fluid approach
to the problem of defining lesser included offenses. '62
Naturally, as soon as a case arose in which the government
59. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
60. Id. at 320-21.
61. Id. at 321.
62. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980).
1992]
200 University of Puget Sound Law Review
could make a compelling case for a lesser included offense
instruction, the court took steps to regain the doctrine's tradi-
tional symmetry by the only means left-compromising the
defendant's right to notice. The case was United States v. Mar-
tin,63 in which the defendant was charged with the same
offense Johnson had been: assault resulting in serious bodily
harm.' The lesser included offense instruction was the same
as that requested in Johnson: assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to do bodily harm.65 The difference was that the
government, not the defendant, requested the instruction. The
trial court gave the instruction, the defendant was convicted of
the lesser offense, and the defendant appealed, arguing that his
constitutional right to notice of the charges against him had
been infringed on.'
The Ninth Circuit rejected that challenge, finding that the
defendant had received adequate notice of the offense for
which he was convicted. This is surprising, because the ele-
ments of that offense were not stated in the indictment-ordi-
narily a fatal defect under the Sixth Amendment." An
elements test would have precluded the instruction on that
ground: its requirement that all elements of the lesser offense
must be elements of the greater is an implicit demand for such
notice. Following Whitaker, however, the Martin court
treated the notice requirement as an issue separate from the
right to the instruction.6
The court found, as it had in Johnson, that the respective
assaults were greater and lesser included offenses under the
inherent relationship standard.69 The court then ensured that
the government would be able to obtain the instruction on the
lesser included offense by setting a relatively low standard for
the separate notice requirement. The government was entitled
63. 783 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 1450. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(f) (1982) (assault resulting in serious bodily
harm).
65. Martin, 783 F.2d at 1450. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1983) (assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to do bodily harm).
66. Martin, 783 F.2d at 1451.
67. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 557-58 (1875). See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 125 (1982).
68. Martin, 783 F.2d at 1452.
69. Martin argued that the offense was not a lesser included offense under the
facts of his particular case--as, of course, the inherent relationship test required him
to do. Given that the assault had been committed with an ax, however, the court
found Johnson controlling. Id. at 1451-52.
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to the instruction on the lesser offense, the court held, because
the offense was a lesser included offense "and the defendant
had timely actual notice of the facts constituting the lesser
charge of which he [was] convicted."70
It is important to recognize that, in the context of the
inherent relationship standard, "actual notice of the facts" is
not a particularly stringent notice requirement. If the facts are
such that the lesser offense is a lesser included offense under
the very fact-specific inherent relationship standard, it is
extremely unlikely the defendant will not have "timely actual
notice of the facts constituting the lesser charge of which he is
convicted."'" Whether the defendant has had notice of the
legal theory the government will use to shape those facts in
instructions and closing argument is, of course, a very different
question. And, not only is it a different question, it is the only
pertinent question. The Sixth Amendment guarantees notice
of the elements of the offense precisely so that the defendant
can mount an effective defense.72
The relaxed notice requirement stated in Martin made it
easier for the government to obtain instructions on lesser
included offenses. In doing so, it redressed the balance upset
by Johnson's repudiation of the elements test and its guaran-
tee of symmetry. That balance was regained, however, at the
cost of constitutionally required notice to the defendant of the
charges levelled against him."s
70. Id. at 1453.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See sources cited supra note 67. Professor Wright has written the following
The fundamental purpose of the pleading is to inform the defendant of the
charge so that he may prepare his defense, and the test for sufficiency ought
to be whether it is fair to defendant to require him to defend on the basis of
the charge as stated in the particular indictment or information.
WRIGHT, supra note 67, § 125, at 365.
73. To be fair, in applying its notice standard, the Martin court seemed to
construe it in the latter sense-as inquiring whether the defense had had a realistic
opportunity to respond to the government's new theory of the case. Still, the court's
evaluation of that opportunity in the case before it was not especially thorough or
incisive. The case was a bench trial, and it appears that the trial judge raised the
possibility of convicting the defendant on the lesser offense sua sponte, after both the
government and the defense had rested. Martin, 783 F.2d at 1453. The defense did not
move to reopen its case, and defense counsel admitted at oral argument that, had the
information been formally amended, there would have been no appealable issue. From
this, the court concluded that the defendant had no colorable defense to the lesser
offense, and had had adequate notice. The court therefore affirmed the conviction on
the lesser offense. Id.
The court's analysis, however, hardly exhausted the varieties of possible prejudice
to the defendant. The trial court's sua sponte inquiry whether a conviction might be
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This trend under the "inherent relationship" standard was
cut short by the Supreme Court's decision in Schmuck v
United States.74 The Court repudiated the "inherent relation-
ship" standard in its entirety, adopting instead an elements test
indistinguishable from that of Workman:
Under this test, one offense is not "necessarily included" in
another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a sub-
set of the elements of the charged offense. Where the lesser
offense requires an element not required for the greater
offense, no instruction is to be given under Rule 31(c). 75
The Court relied on the plain language and history of Rule
31(c), 76 but the principal ground of its holding was the Court's
preference for traditional symmetry in the availability of lesser
included offense instructions. The Court noted that the rule
itself made no distinction between prosecution and defense in
the availability of such instructions.77 More importantly, how-
ever, the Court clearly recognized the potential of the "inher-
ent relationship" standard to foster just the sort of confusion
and unfairness to both sides that Johnson and Martin exempli-
fied. Either the defendant's right to notice will be curtailed, or
the defense will be able to obtain a broader range of lesser
included offense instructions than the government can.
Were the prosecutor able to request an instruction on an
had on a new, different charge did not provide the defendant with a full opportunity to
formulate a theory of the case and a trial strategy-surely not the same opportunity he
would have had had the charge been stated at the outset in the indictment. Part of
that stategy might have included proposing a plea to the lesser charge, but, speaking
realistically, that opportunity too was not available in the context in which this lesser
offense was raised.
The defense might have moved to reopen its case, as the Martin court noted. Id.
at 1453. Again, however, the opportunity to put on a little more evidence is hardly
comparable to the opportunity to develop and execute a complete trial strategy
addressing the charge. Furthermore, in Martin, defense counsel might well have
hesitated to make such a motion in response to the trial court's inquiry for reasons
other than not having a colorable defense to present. Counsel might have feared that
the motion would have been construed as a concession that the court's considering the
lesser offense was proper or as an acknowledgment of vulnerability to the charge.
74. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
75. Id. at 716. In a footnote, the Court added that "the evidence at trial must be
such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, yet
acquit him of the greater." Id. at 716 n.8. That requirement is the equivalent of
Workman's second prong. In fact, for reasons given below, it is a preferable
formulation of that prong, although the requirement can be formulated more
precisely. See infra text following note 223.
76. Schmuck, 489 US. at 716-17, 717 n.9.
77. Id. at 717.
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offense whose elements were not charged in the indictment,
[the defendant's] right to notice would be placed in jeopardy.
Specifically, if, as mandated under the inherent relationship
approach, the determination whether the offenses are suffi-
ciently related to permit an instruction is delayed until all
the evidence is developed at trial, the defendant may not
have constitutionally sufficient notice to support a lesser
included offense instruction requested by the prosecutor if
the elements of that lesser offense are not part of the indict-
ment. Accordingly, under the inherent relationship
approach, the defendant, by in effect waiving his right to
notice, may obtain a lesser offense instruction in circum-
stances where the constitutional restraint of notice to the
defendant would prevent the prosecutor from seeking an
identical instruction.
78
The elements test, in contrast, maintains the balance of
power because it "permits lesser offense instructions only in
those cases where the indictment contains the elements of
both offenses and thereby gives notice to the defendant that he
may be convicted on either charge. This approach preserves
the mutuality implicit in Rule 31(c)."'79 Because the defendant
can obtain a lesser included offense instruction only when she
has implicitly been given notice, her natural advantage in
being able to waive such notice is rendered irrelevant and sym-
metry is maintained.
C Washington's Flirtations With an "Inherent
Relationship" Test
Given the superiority of the elements test in balancing
strategic flexibility on both sides, as well as preserving
prosecutorial discretion and the defendant's right to notice and
opportunity to defend, it would be extremely surprising if the
Washington Supreme Court ever were to depart from that
standard. Given the United States Supreme Court's rejection
of the inherent relationship standard, it would be even
more surprising if the Washington court were to opt for
that approach. Nevertheless, in the recent case of State v.
Curran,8 0 the state's highest court issued this startling
pronouncement:
78. Id. at 718 (footnote omitted).
79. Id.
80. 116 Wash. 2d 174, 804 P.2d 558 (1991).
19921
204 University of Puget Sound Law Review
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included
offense if each of the elements of the lesser offense is a nec-
essary element of the offense charged and the evidence sup-
ports an inference that the lesser crime was committed.
While the lesser offense might not be a stated element of the
greater offense, the lesser must at least be an "inherent
characteristic" of the greater one.
8
As a statement of existing law, that is simply false. Work-
man does indeed state an "inherent characteristic" rule that
modifies the elements test.8 2 It is not, however, a rule of gen-
eral applicability. The inherent characteristic rule is an
extremely limited modification, with a very precise purpose
that applies to only a discrete class of cases: those in which the
greater offense, the offense charged, is an attempt.8 3  If
intended as a proposed modification of the law, the statement
in Curran is dicta. The facts of the case did not necessitate
expanding the scope of the inherent characteristic rule, and
the opinion does not even begin to address whether, why, or
how that might be done.
Curran's dicta is also rather alarming. The principal rea-
son for concern, of course, is the resemblance and the potential
for confusion between the inherent characteristic rule and the
inherent relationship test. The Washington Supreme Court
has fallen victim to that confusion before. Despite the clear
difference between Workman's elements test and the inherent
relationship test, the court made the entirely unwarranted con-
cession in State v. Johnson' that Workman had "tacitly recog-
nized" the inherent relationship test.8 5 The court apparently
had in mind the inherent characteristic rule. That rule, how-
ever, is a very slight modification to the elements test, and it is
no less incompatible with the inherent relationship test than
the elements test itself.8 6 The court's confusion on such a
point is alarming on several levels.8 7
81. Id. at 183, 804 P.2d at 563 (citations omitted).
82. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448, 584 P.2d at 385.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 109-118.
84. 100 Wash. 2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983).
85. Id. at 628, 674 P.2d at 157.
86. See inkfra text accompanying notes 119-134.
87. Almost as alarming is the failure of the state's principal commentators on the
criminal law to recognize the inherent characteristic rule at all. Ferguson and Fine do
not discuss lesser included offenses to attempts as a distinct problem and, as a
consequence, do not treat the inherent characteristic rule. FERGUSON & FINE, supra
note 28, at 6-10. Their error, however, is not merely an error of omission. Where some
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It would be comforting to believe that the confusion
extends no further than the names. Unfortunately, the higher
courts have misunderstood the rationale of the inherent char-
acteristic rule as thoroughly as they have been misled by its
title. In State v. Gatalski,s8 Division One of the Washington
Court of Appeals affirmed the propriety of a lesser included
offense instruction on the ground that the facts of the case
warranted it-despite the fact that the elements test abjures
any reliance on the facts of the particular case-and purported
to apply the logic of Workman to reach that result."9 The
court's readiness to apply a de facto inherent relationship anal-
ysis under a specious claim to Workman's authority can only
be encouraged by the supreme court's careless and inaccurate
invocation of the inherent characteristic rule in Curran.
Division One's error in Gatalski is less surprising than per-
haps it ought to be, for the supreme court itself has begun to
drift away from a strict observance of the elements test. In the
recent case of State v. Pacheco,90 for example, the court's appli-
cation of the elements test was brief and erroneous:
Further, in regard to the assertion that an instruction should
have been given on the unlawful display of a weapon with
intent to intimidate, it is clear that being armed with or dis-
playing a deadly weapon is an essential element (under the
evidence of this case) of robbery in the first degree.9
As ought to be clear by now, to rest an analysis of the legal
prong on the facts of the particular case is to abandon the ele-
ments test altogether and to court a de facto adoption of the
inherent relationship test.
Thus, Curran, Pacheco, Johnson, and Gatalski raise some
questions that, in light of the theory and history of the ele-
ments test, are rather surprising. Are Washington courts on
the verge of abandoning the elements test? Are they about to
courts have interpreted the inherent characteristic rule as a fact-based standard for
attempts, Ferguson and Fine argue that Workman states a fact-based standard for all
offenses. See infra, notes 120, 143. They therefore give unwarranted currency to
Curran's erroneous statement of the elements test.
88. 40 Wash. App. 601, 699 P.2d 804 (1985).
89. Id. at 612-13, 699 P.2d at 810. While Division One has since backed away from
that position, its successive opinions give no indication that the court understood the
significance of its moves. See State v. Falco, 59 Wash. App. 354, 357, 796 P.2d 796, 797
(1990).
90. 107 Wash. 2d 59, 726 P.2d 981 (1986).
91. Id. at 70, 726 P.2d at 987 (emphasis added).
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re-enact the federal courts' struggles with a fact-based stan-
dard for lesser included offenses? Given that the right choices
ought to be obvious, it is disturbing that recent opinions even
suggest those questions.
The answer to both questions, fortunately, is no. Certainly
there is no deliberate trend away from the elements test; at
worst, the courts are stumbling. It may be, moreover, that
they are about to stumble onto something. The elements test
can be improved, and the inherent characteristic rule can serve
as the key to that improvement-if, that is, the supreme court
can grasp the fundamental issues surrounding the elements
test, and if the modification can be made with due regard to
the meaning of the inherent characteristic rule as well as the
hazards of the inherent relationship test.
III. THE LEGAL PRONG: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE
INHERENT CHARACTERISTIC RULE
The inherent characteristic rule holds out a certain prom-
ise for the elements test, a key to the obvious threshhold ques-
tion: for purposes of the comparison prescribed by the
elements test, what is an element? Naturally, however, it is
impossible to see the relevance and utility of the inherent
characteristic rule unless one appreciates the rule itself. The
problem is that the rule is not widely recognized or well
understood, even in its original context, as a necessary modifi-
cation to the elements test where the greater offense is an
attempt. Consequently, if the scope of the rule is to be
expanded, a thorough examination of the attempts problem
and of the logic behind the inherent characteristic rule is a
necessary prerequisite.
A. The Elements Test and Lesser Included
Offenses to Attempts
Despite its many virtues and its obvious superiority to the
inherent relationship test of the federal circuits, the elements
test runs into trouble where the offense charged is an
attempt-some rather deep trouble, in fact. Where the greater
offense is an attempt, the elements test results in a blanket
prohibition on lesser included offense instructions. The princi-
pal distinction between an elements test and the inherent rela-
tionship test is that the former is concerned exclusively with
the statutory elements of the offenses in question, not the facts
[Vol. 16:185
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of the particular case. If the analysis is confined to the statu-
tory elements of the respective offenses, however, a lesser
included offense instruction would never be appropriate where
the offense charged is an attempt.
An attempt is committed where the actor does "any act
which is a substantial step" toward the commission of the com-
plete offense while he is possessed of the intent to commit the
complete offense.92 On its face, "any act which is a substantial
step" is different from any of the acts defining completed
crimes, with the result that no offense necessarily will be com-
mitted in the course of committing an attempt. Any such
lesser offense would have to consist entirely of the one remain-
ing element of the greater offense; that is, of the mental state
alone. Under the fundamental principles of criminal law, the
mental state alone cannot constitute a crime.93
Even relaxing the standard slightly by acknowledging that
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.020(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is guilty
of an attempt to commit a crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any
act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime."
93. The reasons for the requirement of actus reus have been succinctly
summarized by commentator Leo Katz. Referring to the Statute of 25 Edward III,
which made it a crime to "compass" killing the king, he cites Blackstone and writes:
How could one ever enforce such a statute? "No temporal tribunal can search
the heart or fathom the intention of the mind, otherwise than as they are
demonstrated by outward actions," an early commentator noted. He
overlooked, however, the possibility of confession, not necessarily to the
authorities, but perhaps in a letter to a friend. But there were more
compelling reasons for not punishing mere thoughts. If criminal thoughts
could be punished, observed another writer, "all mankind would be
criminals." Another, yet, asked: "What would a system of laws embodying a
rule providing for the punishment of intentions look like? When would
punishment be administered? As soon as we find out the agent's intentions?
But how do we know he will not change his mind? Furthermore, isn't the
series-fantasying, wishing, desiring, wanting, intending-a continuum,
making it a rather hazy matter to know just when a person is intending
rather than wishing?" How would the authorities distinguish between
fantasying, wishing, etc? And what about "the difficulties the individual
would have in identifying the nature of his emotional and mental state.
Would we not be constantly worried about the nature of our mental life?"
Am I only wishing the king were dead? Perhaps I have gone further? "The
resultant guilt," he concludes, "would tend to impoverish and stultify our
mental life." For these reasons, it is now recognized as one of the
fundamental principles of the criminal law that one can only be punished for
acts, one cannot be punished for harboring criminal thoughts or dispositions.
LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 153
(1989) (quoting S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 81 (1975)
(citing JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 78 (1883))); see
G. Dworkin & G. Blumenfeld, Punishment for Intentions, 75 MIND 396-401 (1966).
See also Morris, Punishment for Thoughts, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 22-23 (1976).
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a substantial step has to be some particular act, it remains true
that in each particular case the substantial step taken will be
different. For example, breaking down a door might be a sub-
stantial step toward burglary and would also constitute mali-
cious mischief. But there are any number of acts that might
constitute a substantial step toward burglary that would not
constitute malicious mischief: tampering with but not break-
ing a lock;94 trying a locked door while in possession of burglar
tools; 95 or going to the roof of one's own building while in pos-
session of the floor plan of an adjoining building. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to say, from consideration only of the
elements of the respective offenses, whether a given offense is
or is not a lesser included offense to a given attempt. Strictly
applied, then, the requirement that only the respective ele-
ments should be considered seems to preclude giving a lesser
included offense instruction in any case where an attempt has
been charged.
The problem with this is that there clearly are cases where
in the course of committing an attempt the defendant commits
some lesser offense. Suppose, for example, that a gang mem-
ber opens fire with an automatic weapon on a small group of
rival gang members as they stand on a street corner. No one is
killed, but the evidence of intent to kill is strong enough to
charge the defendant with attempted second degree murder.'
It seems clear that the defendant has also committed first
degree assault,97 and an instruction on that offense ought to be
available.
If the defendant is charged with attempted murder, how-
94. State v. Dupuy, 4 Wash. App. 532, 482 P.2d 794 (1971).
95. State v. Cass, 146 Wash. 585, 264 P. 7 (1928).
96. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.050(1) (1989) provides that "[a] person is guilty of
murder in the second degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause the death of another
person but without premeditation, he causes the death of such person or of a third
person; .... "
97. Id. § 9A.36.011(1) provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of assault in
the first degree if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm . . . [a]ssaults
another with a firearm or any deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to
produce great bodily harm or death...." The term "assault" is not defined by statute,
but by case law:
Three definitions of assault have been recognized by Washington courts: (1)
an attempt, with unlawful force, to inflict bodily injury upon another; (2) an
unlawful touching with criminal intent; and (3) putting another in
apprehension of harm whether or not the actor actually intends to inflict or is
incapable of inflicting that harm.
State v. Hupe, 50 Wash. App. 277, 282, 748 P.2d 263, 266 (1988).
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ever, the trial court might well refuse to instruct on first
degree assault. It is not at all clear that one who takes a sub-
stantial step toward causing the death of another also has nec-
essarily committed an assault with a firearm or deadly weapon
or some force or means likely to produce death or great bodily
harm. In literal terms, taking a "substantial step" is a differ-
ent element from any of those alternative means of commit-
ting first degree assault. Even taking a less literal approach
and acknowledging that a substantial step has to be some par-
ticular act, it seems likely that there are some particular acts
which might be sufficient to constitute a substantial step
toward murder, that are, nevertheless, not among the specified
means of committing first degree assault. Lying in wait or lay-
ing a deadly trap, for example, would not appear to constitute
an assault at all, but could well constitute an attempted mur-
der.98 Consequently, the instruction would likely be denied
where, apart from strict terms of the elements test, justice and
common sense would seem to require it.
The simplest solution would be to allow the instruction on
the lesser included offense where (assuming all the other ele-
ments of the lesser offense are accounted for) the substantial
step actually taken encompasses an element of the lesser
offense otherwise missing from the greater. In the example
given, firing an automatic weapon at the rival gang members is
the substantial step toward second degree murder. It is also
clearly an assault with a firearm. Assuming the other ele-
ments of first degree assault can be located in the attempt,99
the substantial step actually taken might suffice to justify the
instruction on the lesser included offense. While the element
of a "substantial step" does not correspond to the element of
"assault," the substantial step actually taken was, in fact, an
assault.
To give the instruction because the facts warrant it, how-
ever, would be to incorporate consideration of the facts of the
particular case into the analysis-a departure from the strict
elements test adopted in Workman and validated to a great
98. See Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 451 n.2, 584 P.2d at 387 n.2 (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)) for examples of what might
constitute a substantial step.
99. It is fairly easy to demonstrate that the intent element of first degree assault,
intent to inflict great bodily harm, ought to be treated as an element of attempted
second degree murder. See infra text accompanying note 152-55.
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extent by Schmuck v. United States.l °° Division One has, nev-
ertheless, taken such an approach in at least one case. In State
v. Gatalski,"' the court affirmed a conviction for unlawful
imprisonment,1 0 2 which was obtained in a case originally
charged as attempted kidnapping in the first degree.0 3 The
court approved the lesser included offense instruction on the
ground that the substantial step taken toward the kidnapping
was, in fact, the restraint of the victim. °4 That is surprising in
light of Workman's elements test, but it is far less surprising
than the authority the Gatalski court cited for its fact-based
approach:
In the case before us, it is clear the evidence supports a find-
ing of unlawful restraint of another, necessary to a convic-
tion of unlawful imprisonment. Unlawful restraint of
another is a necessary element of kidnapping in the first
degree. Applying the reasoning employed in Workman to
the facts of this case, we conclude unlawful imprisonment
was properly submitted to the jury as a lesser included
offense of attempted kidnapping because the substantial step
taken was actual unlawful restraint of the intended victim.
Gatalski's argument that it is possible for one to attempt a
kidnapping without actually reaching the point of unlaw-
fully restraining another, while factually correct, does not
preclude the instruction under the particular facts of this
case.
105
The court reiterated its factual approach and its reliance on
Workman in State v. Partosa:106
Attempt is a unique type of crime, as it contains the element
of "substantial step", which is not and cannot be statutorily
100. 489 U.S. 705 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
101. 40 Wash. App. 601, 699 P.2d 804 (1985).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.040(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he knowingly restrains another person."
103. First degree kidnapping is defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.020(1) (1989)
as follows:
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree if he intentionally abducts
another with intent:
(a) To hold him for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or
(b) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury on him; or
(d) To inflict extreme mental distress on him or a third person; or
(e) To interfere with the performance of any governmental function.
104. Gatalski, 40 Wash. App. at 613, 699 P.2d at 811.
105. Id.
106. 41 Wash. App. 266, 703 P.2d 1070 (1985).
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defined. Therefore, this legal element of attempted offenses
will be factually different in each case. See State v. Work-
man, 90 Wash.2d 443, 449, 584 P.2d 382 (1978). Where unlaw-
ful restraint of the intended victim is the substantial step
involved in an attempt to kidnap, however, it will invariably
be an element of the greater offense of attempted
kidnapping.
10 7
To the mystery of a fact-based test purportedly based on
Workman, this passage adds the question why the court would
be concerned with whether the substantial step is invariably an
element of the greater offense and, for that matter, what it
meant by "invariably. '10 8
As it happens, then, the inability of the elements test to
accommodate attempts is not just a minor inconvenience in the
trial of attempt cases. As Gatalski and Partosa show, the ele-
ments test, because of this particular inadequacy, harbors a
natural tendency to foster a fact-based approach to lesser
included offense analysis.
B. Workman's Solution to the Attempts Problem
Plainly, a closer examination of Workman is in order.
This is especially true given that the greater offense charged in
Workman was an attempt.1°9 While Workman is commonly
cited for its general two-part standard, it is less often recog-
nized that the case contains a slight modification of that stan-
dard which accomodates the attempts wrinkle. The problem is
that both the modification and the court's explanation for it
are cryptic at best.
Returning from a round of bar-hopping in State Line,
Idaho, one evening in 1976, Workman and Hughes decided they
would rob a convenience store. They took a sawed-off .22 out
of the trunk of the car, hid behind a telephone booth in the
parking lot, and waited for the store to clear out. The attend-
ant happened to see the two, became alarmed, and called the
police. Workman and Hughes were arrested as they gave up
the idea and were returning to their car.110
Workman and Hughes were originally charged with
attempted first degree robbery while armed with a deadly
107. Id. at 272 n.6, 703 P.2d at 1074 n.6.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
109. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 445, 584 P.2d at 385.
110. Id. at 446-47, 584 P.2d at 385.
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weapon."' Both were convicted. New trials were granted.
The supreme court affirmed the grant of new trials on the
ground, inter alia, that the jury should have been instructed
on the lesser included offense of unlawfully carrying a
weapon.
1 12
At first blush, it is not clear how unlawfully carrying a
weapon could be a lesser included offense to attempted first
degree robbery. The type of first degree robbery charged in
Workman was robbery involving the use of a deadly
weapon.1 3  But unlawfully carrying a weapon involves not
merely carrying a weapon, but carrying a weapon in a manner
or under circumstances warranting alarm for the safety of
others. The first degree robbery statute contains no 'circum-
stances warranting alarm' language, indicating that unlawfully
carrying a weapon is not a lesser included offense to first
degree robbery.
The supreme court concluded, however, that because the
charge was attempted first degree robbery, the 'circumstances
warranting alarm' element was a component of the greater
offense:
It is clear that the element of carrying a weapon under RCW
111. Id. at 447, 584 P.2d at 385. Robbery is defined in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.56.190 (1989) as follows:
A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from
the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or
threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or
his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be
used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome
resistance to the taking, in either of which cases the degree of force is
immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that,
although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person
from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear.
Robbery in the first degree is defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.200(1) (1989) as
follows:
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if in the commission of a rob-
bery or of immediate flight therefrom, he:
(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
(b) Displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon; or
(c) Inflicts bodily injury.
112. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448-49, 584 P.2d at 385-86. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.41.270(1) (1989) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for anyone to carry, exhibit, display or draw any firearm,
dagger, sword, knife or other cutting or stabbing instrument, club, or any
other weapon apparently capable of producing bodily harm, in a manner,
under circumstances, and at a time and place that either manifests an intent
to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.
113. 90 Wash. 2d at 447, 584 P.2d at 385.
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9.41.270, the gross misdemeanor, is a necessary element of
the greater crime of first-degree robbery. Likewise, the ele-
ment of circumstances warranting alarm under the lesser
offense is an inherent characteristic of an attempt to commit
a robbery. The existence of such circumstances therefore
qualifies as a necessary element of the greater offense of
attempted first- degree robbery. The first condition of the
test for an included offense is thus met here.
1 1 4
The question is what the Workman court meant by "an
inherent characteristic of an attempt," and how that applies to
other cases in which the offense charged is an attempt. Work-
man itself offers no definition or discussion in connection with
the first prong of the standard: the elements test. The court
did, however, provide a key to the term and its logic in its dis-
cussion of the second prong.
In holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the
instruction on unlawfully carrying a weapon, the court wrote
as follows:
Furthermore, while the State contends the facts do not sup-
port a finding of the elements of the lesser crime because
the station attendant never saw the gun, it is not necessary
in order to prove the crime that the attendant have seen it.
The statute only requires that the circumstances warrant
alarm for the safety of others. They need not actively cause
such alarm. Surely the circumstances of two men who were
armed with a rifle and intending to commit a robbery war-
rant alarm for the safety of anyone who may chance to be
nearby.1
15
In other words, being armed with a deadly weapon while hav-
ing the intent to commit robbery always, and necessarily, con-
stitutes carrying a weapon under "circumstances warranting
alarm." Actual alarm need not be proved.
So construed, the element "circumstances warranting
alarm" is indeed an inherent characteristic of attempted rob-
bery with a deadly weapon. If alarm is warranted whenever an
armed person is possessed of an intent to rob, the element "cir-
cumstances warranting alarm" is inherent in attempted rob-
bery with a deadly weapon in the simple sense that it is always
present in such attempts.
1 6
114. Id. at 448, 584 P.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 448-49, 584 P.2d at 386 (emphasis in original).
116. It is also true that if alarm is warranted whenever an armed person is
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Where the greater offense is an attempt, therefore, the
first prong of the test for lesser included offenses is slightly
different from Workman's own general formula. Workman
holds that a lesser offense is a lesser included offense if each
element of the lesser offense is either an element of the
greater offense or, where the greater offense is an attempt, an
inherent characteristic of the attempt. In Workman, the lesser
offense had two elements. The first, carrying a weapon, was an
element in the greater offense: "It is clear that the element of
carrying a weapon under RCW 9.41.270, the gross misde-
meanor, is a necessary element of the greater crime of first-
degree robbery [under RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)]. ' ' "i '
The second element of the lesser offense, "circumstances
warranting alarm," was an inherent characteristic of the
greater offense, an attempt: "Likewise, the element of circum-
stances warranting alarm under the lesser offense is an inher-
ent characteristic of an attempt to commit a robbery. The
existence of such circumstances therefore qualifies as a neces-
sary element of the greater offense of attempted first-degree
robbery.""'  The court therefore concluded that the first prong
of the test for lesser included offenses was met. Thus, Work-
man formulated and applied, albeit cryptically, an inherent
characteristic rule for attempt cases.
C Distinguishing the Inherent Characteristic Rule from the
Inherent Relationship Test
There is no denying that the inherent characteristic rule is
easily overlooked. This is particularly unfortunate because, if
properly understood and carefully distinguished from the fed-
eral inherent relationship test, the inherent characteristic rule
has the potential to halt the drift forward a fact-based analysis.
It is interesting to note how and why the Gatalski court,
which purported to apply Workman's rule for attempts,
missed the critical distinction between the state and federal
rules. The Gatalski court identified the problem in Workman
as follows:
possessed of an intent to rob, the element "circumstances warranting alarm" is
inherent in every completed robbery. This point, among several others, justifies
expanding the inherent characteristic rule beyond attempt cases. See infra text
accompanying notes 145-68.
117. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448, 584 P.2d at 385.
118. Id.
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Being armed with a deadly weapon is not a necessary ele-
ment of first degree robbery in all cases. The crime can be
completed by displaying what appears to be a firearm or
other deadly weapon, or by inflicting bodily injury. Bodily
injury can be inflicted without the use of a weapon.
119
In other words, because the greater offense can be committed
by alternative means, it is possible to commit the greater
offense without having committed the lesser. 2 °
As a first step in the analysis, that is clearly a step in the
wrong direction. Uncharged alternative means of committing
the greater offense12 1 are irrelevant to the problem of lesser
included offenses. Not all the elements of the greater offense
need be present in the lesser to justify the instruction-the
requirement is the opposite.122 Consequently, just as it makes
no difference that some elements of the greater are not pres-
ent in the lesser, it makes no difference that some alternative
means of committing the greater are not present in the lesser.
What the Gatalski court had in mind, of course, was the
short-hand formulation of the rule.12  If the greater offense
119. State v. Gatalski, 40 Wash. App. 601, 612, 699 P.2d 804, 811.
120. Ferguson and Fine rely on the same premise in concluding that Workman
states a fact-specific standard. FERGUSON & FINE, supra note 28, at 8-9. Where the
Gatalski court concluded that Workman states a fact-specific standard for attempts,
however, Ferguson and Fine conclude that it states a fact-specific standard for all
cases:
Workman holds that the crime of carrying a weapon is included within
attempted first degree robbery. Although carrying a weapon is usually an
element of first degree robbery, this is not always true: first degree robbery
can also be committed by inflicting bodily injury without a weapon. Also, an
attempt to commit first degree robbery can be committed by taking a
substantial step toward commission of that crime, without ever possessing a
weapon. Although the Supreme Court did not spell out its reasoning, the
holding of Workman thus necessarily takes into account the specific facts of
the crime involved.
Id. This wildly erroneous conclusion is a consequence of Ferguson and Fine's failure
to recognize (1) that Workman uses an inherent characteristic rule, (2) that the rule
applies only to attempts, or (3) that attempts present any particular difficulty at all.
See infra note 143.
121. State v. Arndt, 87 Wash. 2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976). Where alternative
means of committing a single crime are charged, the jury need not reach unanimity on
the means actually employed so long as there is sufficient evidence as to each means.
Id. at 376, 553 P.2d at 1329. Whether statutory elements constitute alternative means
of committing a single offense or comprise two distinct offenses is a question of
legislative intent. Id. at 378, 533 P.2d at 1331.
122. "First, each of the elements of the lesser offense must be a necessary element
of the offense charged." Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 447-48, 584 P.2d at 385.
123. "Put another way, if it is possible to commit the greater offense without
having committed the lesser offense, the latter is not an included crime." State v.
216 University of Puget Sound Law Review
can be committed by several different means, and if the means
of committing the lesser offense matches only one of those
alternatives, it is possible to commit the greater without com-
mitting the lesser because the greater might have been com-
mitted by some other means. This short-hand formula,
however, is just that: an abbreviated statement of the standard
that is useful, but limited. It falls short at precisely this point.
An instruction on a lesser included offense is available because
it is implicit in the State's formal accusation, with the result
that the defendant has notice-implicit but sufficient-that he
is also accused of the lesser offense. If the State seeks to con-
vict on a lesser offense that does not involve certain alternative
means of committing the greater, then those alternatives are
irrelevant.124
Contrary to Gatalski's premise, then, the fact that
attempted robbery could be committed by other alternative
means was not the issue in Workman. The crux of the prob-
lem in Workman was the element of circumstances warrant-
ing alarm; the element of the lesser offense that could not be
found anywhere in the wording of the robbery statute, even
under the deadly weapon alternative.
Having misidentified the basic issue in Workman, the
Gatalski court could do little with the substance of the opinion.
Rather than examining the Workman court's discovery of "cir-
cumstances warranting alarm" in the intersection of the
Bishop, 90 Wash. 2d 185, 191, 580 P.2d 259, 261 (1978) (quoting State v. Roybal, 82
Wash. 2d 577, 583, 512 P.2d 718, 721 (1973)).
124. The corresponding problem of alternative means of commission in the lesser
offense is also worth comment. As shown above, alternative means of committing the
greater offense are irrelevant to the analysis because not every element of the greater
must be present in the lesser: the requirement is the opposite. But precisely because
of that, alternative means of committing the lesser offense seem to present a knottier
problem. For example, it seems impossible for all the various means of committing
first degree assault to be present in every attempted murder.
Fortunately, the problem is more apparent than real. On reflection, one quickly
realizes that if only one alternative need be present for the offense to have been
committed, only one alternative need be present for the offense to constitute a lesser
included offense. If any one of the means by which first degree assault can be
committed is present in every attempted murder, then attempted murder cannot be
committed without also committing first degree assault by that means. Every
attempted murder will thus present a complete set of the necessary elements of an
assault. The remaining alternative means of committing assault drop out of the
problem as irrelevant. Therefore, not every alternative means of committing the
lesser offense need be present in every instance of the greater for the lesser to
constitute a lesser included offense.
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attempt and robbery statutes,'125 the Gatalski court seized on a
passing reference in Workman to "the facts of this case"126 and
propounded its own fact-based standard in Workman's
name.2 7 Workman, however, abjures any examination of the
facts of the particular case, and does so-as the federal experi-
ence demonstrates-for good and sound reasons. Gatalski's
claim to Workman's imprimatur is entirely specious.
Where Gatalski equated Workman's inherent characteris-
tic rule with the Ninth Circuit's inherent relationship test in
practice, the supreme court itself has equated them in name.
In State v. Johnson,2 " the defendant urged the court to adopt
the Ninth Circuit standard and cited Workman in support. He
was rebuffed. The court's reasoning, while sound, was
confusing:
We decline to recognize and apply the "inherent relation-
ship" test in the circumstances of this case. We did tacitly
recognize such a test in State v. Workman, where we held
that the element of "circumstances warranting alarm" neces-
sary to prove unlawful possession of a weapon was included
within attempted first degree robbery because it was "an
inherent characteristic of an attempt to commit a robbery."
There, however, the elements of the lesser offense were
invariably inherent in the greater offense and were part of
the same act.'2
The court apparently was unable to appreciate the funda-
mental difference between Workman's elements test and the
Ninth Circuit's fact-based standard: Workman clearly does
not "tacitly recognize" a fact-based standard for attempts.
Nevertheless, the distinction drawn in State v. Johnson is
critical to understanding the inherent characteristic rule of
Workman. The key to that distinction is the mysterious term
noted in Partosa: "invariably."' 30  While both the inherent
characteristic rule for attempts and the inherent relationship
standard look at inherent properties of the respective offenses,
the Ninth Circuit test permitted the court to find a lesser
included offense even where proof of the greater offense did
125. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448-49, 584 P.2d at 385-86.
126. Id. at 447, 584 P.2d at 385.
127. Gatalski, 40 Wash. App. at 612-13, 699 P.2d at 810.
128. 100 Wash. 2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983).
129. Id. at 628, 674 P.2d at 157-58 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
130. State v. Partosa, 41 Wash. App. 266, 272 n.6, 703 P.2d 1070, 1074 n.6 (1985).
See supra text accompanying note 108.
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"not necessarily invariably" involve proof of the lesser
offense.'31 In contrast, Workman's inherent characteristic
rule for attempts does require proof of the lesser offense in the
course of proving the greater offense in every case.132 The ele-
ment of the lesser is said to be inherent in the greater offense
precisely because it is always present in such attempts.
Viewed in this light, Workman's inherent charactistic rule
is not really so great a departure from the general elements
test. The general rule is that each element of the lesser
offense must be an element of the greater offense.133 Where
the greater offense is an attempt, Workman permits "an
inherent characteristic of the attempt" to substitute for "an
element of the greater offense" in that test.134 The meaning
Workman gives to the term inherent characteristic, however,
is highly restrictive. An element of the lesser offense is an
inherent characteristic of the attempt (the greater offense)
only if that element is invariably present in such attempts. As
in the elements test itself, the focus is not on the facts of the
individual case, but on the nature of the offense.
Workman's inherent characteristic rule, then, provides a
rather brilliant solution to the problem of lesser included
offenses to attempts. By means of a very slight modification to
the elements test, which faithfully observes that test's underly-
ing logic, the inherent characteristic rule removes the blanket
prohibition on lesser included offenses to attempts and makes
such instructions as freely available as in any other case.
D. Expanding the Scope of the Inherent Characteristic Rule
Still, there is not much point in providing a brilliant solu-
tion to a problem if the problem is never recognized and the
solution is never used. The supreme court has never expressly
acknowledged that attempts present any particular difficulty
for the analysis of lesser included offenses. Neither that court
nor the court of appeals has ever analyzed the problem thor-
oughly. In State v. Johnson, as a consequence, the supreme
court was somehow convinced that it had "tacitly recognize[d]"
the inherent relationship test in Workman.' 35
131. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980); see United States
v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
132. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448-49, 584 P.2d at 386.
133. Id. at 447-48, 584 P.2d at 385.
134. Id. at 448, 584 P.2d at 385.
135. State v. Johnson, 100 Wash. 2d at 628, 674 P.2d at 157.
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Furthermore, no appellate court has actually used the
inherent characteristic rule to decide an attempt case. In State
v. Jackson,3 6 for example, the defendant was accused of hav-
ing kicked in a plexiglass door to a store and was charged with
attempted second degree burglary.'3 ' He requested an instruc-
tion on third degree malicious mischief, which was refused.1
38
He was convicted and he appealed, arguing that by kicking in
the door he had in fact committed malicious mischief, and that,
therefore, the instruction on the lesser offense ought to have
been given. 39
The supreme court rejected that contention. 4 In doing
so, however, the court failed even to hint at the issues lying
behind Jackson's argument. The opinion cites Workman only
for its general standard, with no mention whatever of the
inherent characteristic rule.141 The court failed to acknowledge
that Workman was an attempt case, that justifying a lesser
included offense to an attempt is a singular problem, or that
Workman propounded a modification to the general rule to
cope with that problem. The court simply noted, correctly, but
too succinctly, that because burglary might be committed by
entering an unlocked door without permission, malicious mis-
chief is not invariably present in burglaries. 42 Why this pre-
cluded its being considered a lesser included offense to the
attempt was never explained. 43
136. 112 Wash. 2d 867, 774 P.2d 1211 (1989).
137. Id. at 870, 774 P.2d at 1212. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.020(1) (1989) defines
first degree burglary as follows:
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a
crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in
a dwelling and if, in entering or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight
therefrom, the actor or another participant in the crime (a) is armed with a
deadly weapon, or (b) assaults any person therein.
138. Jackson, 112 Wash. 2d at 871, 774 P.2d at 1212. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.48.090(1) (1989) defines malicious mischief in the third degree as follows:
A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the third degree if he knowingly
and maliciously causes physical damage to the property of another, under
circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief in the first or second
degree.
139. Jackson, 112 Wash. 2d at 870, 774 P.2d at 1212.
140. Id. at 878, 774 P.2d at 1216.
141. Id. at 877, 774 P.2d at 1216.
142. Id. at 878, 774 P.2d at 1216.
143. One consequence of the Jackson opinion is Ferguson and Fine's conclusion
that Workman states a fact-based standard for all offenses, not just attempts. See
discussion supra notes 87, 120. Because they fail to perceive the inherent characteristic
rule at all, let alone the fact that it is a minor variation on the elements test, Ferguson
and Fine seize on Jackson's reference to the elements of the lesser offense being
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Given the neglect of the inherent characteristic rule even
in attempt cases, it is rather surprising that it should surface in
State v. Curran,"' a case in which the greater offense was not
an attempt, but completed vehicular homicide. It would not
have been necessary to extend the inherent characteristic rule
to completed offenses to decide Curran, even if the court had
any idea how or why that might be done-and the opinion
bears no sign that the court did. Curran's invocation of the
inherent characteristic rule seems to have been completely
inadvertent.
Nevertheless, the inherent characteristic rule can and
should be extended to completed offenses. Properly under-
stood and applied, the rule could provide a certain flexibility to
the elements test without infringing on its constitutional notice
function.
"invariably" present in the greater offense. In doing so, they categorize Jackson as an
attempt case in which the elements test was strictly applied. Because these
commentators view Workman as taking a fact-based approach, they find Workman
"irreconcilably inconsistent" with Jackson. Because Jackson is an attempt case, they
reason, Workman cannot be read as stating a rule for attempt cases. They conclude,
then, that Workman states a fact-based standard for all offenses. FERGUSON & FINE,
supra note 28, at 9.
Once the inherent characteristic rule and its rationale are drawn out, however, it
is clear not only that Jackson is a correct application of the inherent characteristic
rule, but that it is entirely consistent with Workman. The real question is whether
the court was at all conscious that it was analyzing the issue properly. One feels a
temptation to write "show your work" in the margin.
144. 116 Wash. 2d 174, 176, 804 P.2d 558, 559 (1991). Perhaps it is not so surprising,
however, given Curran's inept application of the elements test to the question before
it. The greater offense was, as noted, vehicular homicide. That offense is defined in
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.520 (1989 & Supp. 1990-91), which provides in pertinent part:
When the death of any person ensues within three years as a proximate result
of injury proximately caused by... the operation of any vehicle in a reckless
manner or with disregard for the safety of others, the person so operating
such vehicle is guilty of vehicular homicide.
The lesser offense asserted in Curran was reckless driving: "Any person who
drives any vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is
guilty of reckless driving." WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.500 (1989 & Supp. 1990-91). The
Curran court concluded that reckless driving was not a lesser included offense to
vehicular homicide because the greater offense could be committed by driving with
disregard for the safety of others as well as by driving recklessly. Curran, 116 Wash.
2d at 183, 804 P.2d at 563. The error here is that alternative means of committing the
greater offense are irrelevant to the analysis. So long as one of several alternative
means of commission corresponds to the elements of the lesser offense, all elements of
the lesser offense will be included among the elements of the greater. See supra text
accompanying notes 123-24.
Reckless driving is not a lesser included offense to vehicular homicide because the
greater offense requires proof of only "disregard for the safety of others," while the
lesser requires proof of "wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons."
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The need for such flexibility arises from the threshhold
question that is seldom, if ever, addressed in the reported
cases: for purposes of the comparison of elements prescribed
by the rule, what is an element? There are several dimensions
to that issue. The problem of lesser included offenses to
attempts is one. Another problem is the status of non-statu-
tory elements, although that issue is fairly trivial. Given the
roots of the elements test in the constitutional notice require-
ment, it is clear that non-statutory elements must be included
in the analysis.14
The interesting question is what can only be termed inher-
ent characteristics of offenses. In other words, the issue is
whether, for purposes of the elements test, an element of the
lesser offense can be considered an element of the greater
offense simply because that fact or act is necessarily present in
each instance of the greater offense.
For example, in State v. Wilson,'46 the defendant was
charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance,
147
and he requested a lesser included offense instruction on
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 148 The State
conceded that the elements prong was met and the trial court,
as well as Division Three, simply accepted that concession.1
49
Similarly in the case of State v. Rodriguez,'" Division One
faced the same issue, and the court actually cited Wilson as
authority for the proposition that unlawful possession of a con-
trolled substance is a lesser included offense to unlawful
delivery.15 1
One might well ask, however, if that is true. The statute
145. The Washington Supreme Court recently held that "[all essential elements
of a crime, statutory or otherwise, must be included in a charging document in order to
afford notice to an accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86, 88 (1991) (emphasis added). The
necessity of including non-statutory elements in the analysis is also reflected in
Workman's requirement that each element of the lesser offense be a "necessary"
element of the greater. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 447-48, 584 P.2d at 385.
146. 41 Wash. App. 397, 704 P.2d 1217 (1985).
147. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401(a) (1989) provides as follows: "[It is unlawful
for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance."
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401(d) (1989) provides as follows: "It is unlawful for
any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly
from, or pursuant to, a valid presecription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice .. "
149. Wilson, 41 Wash. App. at 399, 704 P.2d at 1219.
150. 48 Wash. App. 815, 740 P.2d 904 (1987).
151. Id. at 816-17, 740 P.2d at 905.
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defining unlawful delivery does not use the term possession,
except with regard to the distinct offense of possession with
intent to deliver. Nor does case law establish possession as an
element of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. How,
then, is the elements test met as between unlawful delivery
and unlawful possession? In the nature of things, of course,
one cannot deliver something without having possession of it.
Yet, the question is whether that is enough to make "posses-
sion" in the lesser offense an element of the greater offense for
purposes of the elements test.
Older versions of the assault statutes present another
instance of the same problem. In State v. Young,152 the court
considered whether assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to do bodily harm5 3 could be considered a lesser included
offense to assault with intent to commit murder.'5 The court
did not hesitate to find that it could, by delving into the neces-
sary, logical relationship between the two states of mind. Obvi-
ously the intent to inflict bodily injury is always present where
the actor has an intent to kill. To say that an actor intended
death without intending to cause bodily injury that would
make death probable would be absurd. To cause death without
also causing life-threatening bodily injury is an impossibility.
[T]he argument that the allegation "with intent to kill and
murder" is an equivalent allegation, and has included within
it the allegation "to inflict bodily injury," is not only in con-
sonance with common sense, but is suppported by universal
authority. In fact, no other conclusion could be reached
without reversing the laws of nature.1
55
Young's common sense approach is typical of the way
courts treat issues of inherent characteristics. Ad hoc, practi-
cal resolutions predominate in the case law, usually with little
or no reflection on the general problem, let alone any proposal
to modify the elements test to accomodate it. There would be
no reason to tamper with that tradition if the issues were
always as clear as they seemed to be in Wilson, Rodriguez,
and Young. As it happens, however, there are hard cases, and
an express, rigorous solution to the problem of inherent char-
acteristics of offenses is needed to deal with them.
152. 22 Wash. 273, 60 P. 650 (1900).
153. Bal. Code § 7057 (1897).
154. Id. § 7058.
155. Young, 22 Wash. at 275, 60 P. at 651.
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Division One and Division Two each recently faced such a
hard case and split over the proper analysis. In State v. Hodg-
son," 6 Division One held that indecent liberties'57 is not a
lesser included offense to statutory rape in the first degree.1
5
The former offense requires proof that the victim is not mar-
ried to the defendant while the latter does not. Because the
lesser offense includes an element not found in the greater, the
court quite reasonably concluded that the elements test was
not met. 59
Faced with the same issue in State v. Bailey,6 ' Division
Two offered an altogether different answer. The court con-
cluded that the elements test was met as between indecent lib-
erties and first degree statutory rape because non-marriage is
"an implicit element" of the greater offense:
We believe that the analysis in Hodgson leads to absurd
results. First, the Legislature cannot possibly have contem-
plated statutory rape in the first degree being perpetrated on
one's spouse. In the unlikely event that a child of 10 years
or less establishes sufficient necessity to receive permission
from the superior court to marry, it is inconceivable that the
Legislature intended to criminalize consensual sexual inter-
course between spouses, regardless of their ages. The fact
that the Legislature did not expressly make nonmarriage an
element of first degree statutory rape can lead to only one
logical conclusion: the Legislature did not expect that chil-
dren under the age of 10 would be marrying. Therefore, the
only plausible reading of former RCW 9A.44.070 is to con-
sider nonmarriage an implicit element of the crime.1
61
As in the case of possession and delivery, the court treated an
element of the lesser offense as an element of the greater
because it concluded that the defendant's committing the ele-
ments of the greater necessarily must have been accompanied
by such an act or fact.
156. 44 Wash. App. 592, 722 P.2d 1336 (1986).
157. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.100(1) (1989) (amended 1988) stated that
"[a] person is guilty of indecent liberties when he knowingly causes another person
who is not his spouse to have sexual contact with him or another: .... "
158. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.070(1) (repealed 1988) provided that "[a]
person over thirteen years of age is guilty of statutory rape in the first degree when
the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is less than eleven
years old."
159. Hodgson, 44 Wash. App. at 599-600, 722 P.2d at 1340.
160. 52 Wash. App. 42, 757 P.2d 541 (1988).
161. Id. at 46, 757 P.2d at 544.
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There is, however, reason to doubt that conclusion. As the
Hodgson court recognized, it may be unlikely that a ten-year
old would marry, but it is not impossible. 16 2 Nor is it physi-
cally or logically impossible, however unreasonable or
unlikely, that the legislature would criminalize intercourse
with children under eleven, married or not. Such a law would
indeed contradict the law permitting ten-year-olds to marry,'63
but rules of statutory construction are not laws of nature. The
contradiction presented in Hodgson and Bailey is qualitatively
different from the contradictions, the literal impossibilities,
presented in Young, Wilson, and Rodriguez.
As a general solution to the problem of inherent charac-
teristics of offenses, and as a rule to decide the hard cases, the
inherent characteristic rule of Workman is an obvious choice.
Possession can be treated as an element of unlawful delivery of
a controlled substance because possession is an inherent char-
acteristic of unlawful delivery; that is, possession is present in
every case of delivery. Intent to inflict bodily injury can be
treated as an element of assault with intent to murder because
it is an inherent characteristic of such an assault. In other
words, intent to inflict bodily injury is always and necessarily
present where there is an intent to kill. One cannot say with
the same certainty, however, that nonmarriage is an inherent
characteristic of first degree statutory rape. It is not impossi-
ble that a person younger than eleven will marry and engage
in sexual intercourse with his or her spouse. Nor is it impossi-
ble, however unreasonable or unlikely, that the legislature
might have intended to criminalize it.
Accordingly, the elements test might be modified so as to
provide that: each element of the lesser offense must be a nec-
essary element or an inherent characteristic of the greater
offense. That formula, of course, is essentially the same as that
stated in Curran.1' 4 The difference is that the Curran court's
statement was nothing more than a slip of the pen. The
formula offered here is part of a serious proposal that existing
law be changed. The need, at least, is illustrated by Young,
Wilson, Rodriquez, and especially by the hard cases of Hodg-
son and Bailey.
162. Hodgson, 44 Wash. App. at 599, 722 P.2d at 1340.
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1989) provides that a person under the age of
eighteen may marry upon a showing of necessity before the Superior Court.




E. Defending a General Application of the Inherent
Characteristic Rule
One might reasonably ask whether the inherent character-
istic rule can or should be extended. Does its original rationale
work outside the context of attempts? How is the constitu-
tional notice function of the elements test affected? Is there
still a danger of drifting into a fact-based approach to lesser
included offense analysis reminiscent of the ill-fated federal
experiments?
For proof that the rationale for the inherent characteristic
rule can be extended to completed offenses, one need look no
further than Workman itself. While the inherent characteris-
tic rule was prompted by the attempts problem, the rationale
the case offers in support of the rule is not, in fact, limited to
attempts. Recall that the court found "circumstances warrant-
ing alarm" to be an inherent characteristic of attempted first
degree robbery because a person being armed with a deadly
weapon while possessed of the intent to rob is a circumstance
that, objectively, warrants alarm for the safety of others.1 65 On
reflection, one quickly realizes that that is just as true for a
completed robbery as it is for an attempted robbery. An armed
robber who succeeds, no less than one who does not, is pos-
sessed of that same combination of intention and being armed
in such a manner that warrants alarm, objectively, for the
safety of others. Consequently, unlawfully carrying a weapon
can be considered a lesser included offense to a completed first
degree robbery, just as it is a lesser included offense to
attempted first degree robbery. 6
As for the constitutional function of the elements test, it
remains intact even with the addition of an inherent character-
istic rule. Admittedly, however, there is some cause for con-
cern. The theory behind the elements test is that, by the
information's stating the greater offense, the defendant
receives notice, implicit but sufficient, that he is also charged
with the lesser offense. This rationale assumes that defense
counsel, going over an information with her client, will be able
165. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d at 448-49, 584 P.2d at 385-86.
166. The courts' assumption in State v. Pacheco, 107 Wash. 2d 59, 726 P.2d 981
(1986), that the elements test was met as between first degree robbery and unlawfully
carrying a weapon, could be justified on such a theory. As in Curran, however, there
is no sign that the court's statement to that effect was based on this or any other close
interpretation of Workman.
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to see that the elements stated in the information can be subdi-
vided and, in fact, state two offenses, one inside the other.
Because an inherent characteristic of the greater offense is not
an express element, it might be overlooked in such a review of
the information. If this is the case, counsel might overlook the
possibility of conviction on the lesser included offense as well.
That possibility does not, however, fatally infringe on the
constitutional notice function of the elements test. Constitu-
tionally, the State is entitled to all fair inferences from its
charging language--and it is entitled to rely on a certain
amount of common sense on the part of the defense:
[W]e observe that it has never been necessary to use the
exact words of a statute in a charging document; it is suffi-
cient if words conveying the same meaning and import are
used. This same rule applies to nonstatutory elements. It is
therefore not fatal to an information or complaint that the
exact words of a case law element are not used; the question
in such situations is whether all the words used would rea-
sonably apprise an accused of the elements of the crime
charged. Words in a charging document are read as a whole,
construed according to common sense, and include facts
which are necessarily implied.
16 7
As defined by Workman and Johnson, the inherent char-
acteristics of an offense are inherent in the greater offense in
the simple sense that they are present in every instance of it.
Under that definition, they are "facts that are necessarily
implied" in an information. Consequently, the inherent char-
acteristics of the greater offense are stated, in an otherwise
adequate information, just as the elements of the greater
offense are. If, then, the information adequately states the
greater offense, the defendant necessarily will receive constitu-
tionally sufficient notice of the lesser offense-just as the
implicit notice rationale supposes-regardless of whether the
elements of the lesser offense are elements or inherent charac-
teristics of the greater.'" Therefore, to expand the elements
167. State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d 93, 108-109, 812 P.2d 86, 93-94 (1991) (emphasis
added).
168. Furthermore, the absence of word-for-word notice of the elements of the
lesser offense has never been deemed a problem in the related but distinct doctrine of
lesser degree offenses. The doctrine of lesser degree offenses was established by
statute in 1854 at the same time as the doctrine of lesser included offenses. The
statute, currently codified as WASH. REv. CODE § 10.61.003 (1989), provides as follows:
Upon an indictment or information for an offense consisting of different
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test to provide that each element of the lesser offense must be
a necessary element or an inherent characteristic of the
greater offense does not infringe on the constitutional notice
function of the test.
While there may be no constitutional impediment to incor-
porating the inherent characteristic rule into the elements test
generally, it is still fair to ask whether there is some danger in
doing so. As the supreme court demonstrated in State v. John-
son, the inherent characteristic rule and the inherent relation-
ship test of the federal circuits are easily confused. In light of
cases like Pacheco and Gatalski, it seems that the danger
extends beyond the names. It is not inconceivable that if
courts begin looking into the inherent characteristics, as well
as the elements of the greater offense, they will eventually
drift off into examining the characteristics of the crime before
them, rather than those things that truly are present in every
instance of the offense. If they do, it might well result in the
beginning of a fact-based standard and a re-enactment of the
federal experience.
That danger can be reduced to a minimum, however, sim-
degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in
the indictment or information, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of
an attempt to commit the offense.
The effect of this statute is to make an instruction on a lesser offense available where
it seems it should be available, but where, due to the vagaries of legislative drafting, it
is not. For example, one would expect that a defendant charged with first degree
assault could also obtain jury instructions on second, third, and fourth degree assault.
And so he could. However, such instructions would not be available under the doc-
trine of lesser included offenses. The various assaults are distinguished by the means
used and the type of harm inflicted. Those distinct means and harms do not fit, con-
ceptually, within one another, with the result that justifying instructions on lesser
degrees of assault under the elements test is impossible. The instructions on the lesser
assaults would be available, not as lesser included offenses under WASH. REv. CODE
§ 10.61.006 (1989), but as lesser degree offenses under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.61.003
(1989).
The supreme court tends to ignore the doctrine of lesser degree offenses. In State
v. Dennison, 115 Wash. 2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), for example, the court chided the
defendant for failing to understand that second degree murder and first and second
degree manslaughter are not lesser included offenses to first degree felony murder.
The court, however, failed to understand that second degree murder and first and sec-
ond degree manslaughter are lesser degree offenses to first degree felony murder. Fol-
lowing State v. Gottstein, 111 Wash. 600, 191 P.2d 766 (1920), Dennison could and
should have been decided not on the first prong, but on the second prong. That is, the
court should have acknowledged that the first prong was met under the doctrine of
lesser degree offenses, then held that the proof of the acts alleged to constitute second
degree murder or manslaughter also established first degree burglary. That proof,
establishing as it did a felony upon which first degree felony murder could be pre-
mised, precluded any finding that any lesser degree homicide had been committed.
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ply by the courts' attending to the various points made above.
The inherent relationship test was fundamentally inconsistent
with the classic elements test because it turned on an examina-
tion of the particular facts of the individual case rather than on
the nature of the offense. Consequently, the inherent relation-
ship test authorized instructions on lesser offenses that were
"not necessarily invariably" part of the greater offense. The
result was an erosion of the symmetry in the availability of
lesser included offense instructions, which historically has
been considered a prime value in the doctrine.
The inherent characteristic rule, in contrast, is but a slight
modification to the elements test. Like the elements test, the
inherent charactistic rule turns not on an examination of the
facts of the individual case, but rather on the nature of the
given offense. Like the elements test, the inherent characteris-
tic rule requires that the element of the lesser offense be, if
not an element of the greater, at least present in every
instance of the greater. The rule thus preserves symmetry in
the availability of the instructions. Even more important, it
preserves the constitutional notice function of the elements
test.
If courts keep these distinctions in mind, they should have
no difficulty in carrying out the modest experiment of
extending the inherent characteristic rule beyond attempt
cases to general application as part of the elements test itself.
The primary benefit of such a modification-obviating any dif-
ficulties over what counts as an element for purposes of the
elements test-is well worth the risk.
IV. THE EVIDENCE PRONG: THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FORMULA
In State v. Bowerman,'69 the defendant was charged with
aggravated first degree murder. 70 It was alleged that she had
169. 115 Wash. 2d 794, 802 P.2d 116 (1990).
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of murder in the first degree when... [w]ith a premeditated intent to cause the
death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; ....
Relatedly, WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (1989) provides in pertinent part as follows:
A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits first
degree murder as defined by WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1)(a), as now or
hereafter amended, and one or more of the following aggravating
circumstances exist:...
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid
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hired Hutcheson to kill Nickel, a former boyfriend. Bowerman
requested an instruction on second degree murder,171 which
was refused. The supreme court affirmed, concluding that
because the evidence did not support giving the instruction,
Workman's second prong was not met. 72
While it was dispositive in Bowerman, the second prong of
Workman can easily be made to appear unnecessary in two
different ways. First, no party is ever entitled to an instruction
that the evidence will not support.17  There seems no reason
to suppose, from the way in which the Workman case framed
it, that the evidence prong is anything more than a convenient
reminder of that general limitation. But few, if any, of those
involved in assembling the instructions in criminal trials need
such a reminder.
Second, it seems, at first glance, that the second prong of
Workman must always be met where the first prong is.
Bowerman's holding ought to cause at least a moment's hesita-
tion. Given that the first prong of Workman was clearly
met,174 how is it that the second was not? If the evidence was
sufficient to enable the State to obtain an instruction and go to
or had agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing the
murder; ....
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.050(l) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of murder in the second degree when .. . [w]ith intent to cause the death of
another person but without premeditation, he causes the death of such person or of a
third person; ......
172. Bowerman, 115 Wash. 2d at 806, 802 P.2d at 124.
173. State v. Hughes, 106 Wash. 2d 176, 191, 721 P.2d 902, 910 (1986).
174. One who premeditates and intends to kill, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1)(a)
(1989 & Supp. 1990-91), obviously intends to kill. Id. § 9A.32.050(1). Causing the death
of another, the only remaining element of either type of murder, is also common to
both.
In fact, the elements test is met as to all degrees of homicide under the doctrine of
lesser included mental states. State v. Jones, 95 Wash. 2d 616, 621, 628 P.2d 472, 475
(1981); State v. Collins, 30 Wash. App. 1, 15, 632 P.2d 68, 75 (1981). The doctrine of
lesser included mental states was created as part of the revised criminal code adopted
in 1975. In that code, the legislature, for the first time, expressly defined the mental
states on which certain offenses are premised. In an apparent attempt to coordinate
those definitions with the doctrine of lesser included offenses, the legislature adopted a
provision setting forth the doctrine of "lesser included mental states." LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REVISED WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE § 9A.08.020
cmt. at 34-35 (1970). Currently codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(2) (1989), the
statute provides as follows:
Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness, and Knowledge. When a
statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an
offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element,
such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.
1992]
230 University of Puget Sound Law Review
the jury on first degree murder, and if the defendant could not
have committed the elements of first degree murder without
also committing the elements of second degree murder, it
seems that the evidence must have been sufficient for an
instruction on second degree murder. If, by definition, the
lesser offense is necessarily committed in the course of com-
mitting the greater offense, then it seems that the evidence
should always support giving the instruction on the lesser
offense.
Of course, both objections to the second prong are illusory.
Taken together, however, they indicate why and how the sec-
ond prong ought to be reformulated. Thinking through the
objections, one begins to see the distinctive issues that lie
behind the evidence prong of the test for lesser included
offenses. It also becomes apparent that Workman's overly
general "evidence in support" formula has obscured those
issues.
This might not have been a problem. Because it is so gen-
eral, the second prong of Workman is broad enough to capture
the cases an evidence prong ought to. However, given that the
evidence prong serves a purpose unique to the doctrine of
lesser included offenses, there has been a natural trend in the
cases toward drawing that purpose out. In doing so, however,
the courts of the state have been remarkably inept. Their
efforts have produced several fundamentally flawed corollaries
to Workman's second prong, none of which reflect a clear
understanding of the primary purpose of the evidence prong.
What is needed at this point is a different formulation of the
When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element is also
established if the person acts intentionally.
The black-letter rule that manslaughter is a lesser included offense to murder is,
under the current code, entirely dependent on this provision. As first and second
degree manslaughter are defined in the present criminal code, an intuitively strong
case can be made that they are not lesser included offenses to murder. First degree
manslaughter is premised on recklessness, while second degree manslaughter is pre-
mised on negligence. Recklessness and negligence have to do with risk: disregard of a
known risk or failure to recognize risk. Both degrees of murder, however, are pre-
mised on an intent to kill. How can it be, then, that the mental element of either type
of manslaughter is necessarily proved in the course of proving the murder? Proof of
intent-a deliberate, object-oriented frame of mind-would seem, rather, to disprove
recklessness and negligence. To bar precisely this inference, the legislature has inter-
vened to ensure, by fiat, that the mental elements of the homicides stack up neatly,
one inside the other. Hence, the doctrine of lesser included mental states.
The same result can be reached under the doctrine of lesser degree offenses as set
forth in WASH. REV. CODE § 10.61.003 (1989). See supra note 168.
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evidence prong, one that captures the logic of the earliest
cases. After examining the history and purpose of the rule,
this section will propose such a test.
A. The Early Cases and Preclusion by the Evidence
Why then was Bowerman properly denied an instruction
on second degree murder? The opinion in Bowerman is of lit-
tle help:
The defendant asserted that, due to her diminished capacity,
she did not have the intent to kill Nickel. If the jury
believed Bowerman's defense then it could not have found
her guilty of second degree murder. Therefore, the only
choices the jury would have had were to'find Bowerman
guilty of aggravated first degree murder, or to find her not
guilty of any crime. Under those circumstances, a lesser
included instruction is not warranted.1
7 5
At face value, this explanation is absurd. Why should the pos-
sibility that the jury might accept her defense of diminished
capacity deprive Bowerman of an instruction on second degree
murder? As the court says, if the jury believed Bowerman's
defense, she would be acquitted of second degree murder. But
it is equally true that, if the jury believed she suffered from
diminished capacity, she would be acquitted of the charge of
aggravated first degree murder. Her chosen defense would not
preclude instructing the jury on that charge. Why should it
preclude instructing the jury on second degree murder?
The court seems to be saying that Bowerman waived any
right to such an instruction by her choice of defense. Clearly,
however, that cannot be what the court means to say. Not only
is there no requirement that the defense choose a single theory
of the case,' 76 but strictly speaking, the instruction on the
lesser included offense is not part of the defendant's case at all.
The instruction on the lesser offense is available because it is
175. State v. Bowerman, 115 Wash. 2d 794, 806, 802 P.2d 116, 123 (1990) (citations
omitted).
176. There is no prohibition as such on inconsistent defenses. A defendant is
entitled to instructions on inconsistent theories of the case so long as there is some
evidence in support of each theory. "If any one of the theories argued by the
defendant was supported by substantial evidence, it should have been submitted to the
jury." State v. Griffith, 91 Wash. 2d 572, 574- 75, 589 P.2d 799, 802 (1979). In Griffith,
the defendant requested instructions on accidental homicide and self-defense. Both of
those theories rely on an absence of the intent to kill, but differ in what they suppose
really did happen. The facts did not support either theory, but the court was not
troubled by the inconsistency between them. Similarly, in State v. Manuel, 94 Wash.
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implicit in the greater charge. As such, it constitutes an accu-
sation by the State no less than the greater charge itself. The
defendant cannot justly be said to contradict her own defense
if she does no more than draw out the implications of the
State's accusation. Even less can she be said to have waived
the right to draw out those implications merely by choosing a
given defense.
Still, if Bowerman did not waive her right to an instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense, why was she properly
denied the instruction? There is no question that Bowerman
was correctly decided. The case's true logic, however, lies bur-
ied in the pre-Workman case law. The evidence prong has
both a substantial ancestry and a compelling rationale-
neither of which is apparent from Workman.
In the earliest case discussing the evidence prong, State v.
Robinson,'77 the defendant was accused of having conspired to
murder the victim and was charged with being an accessory
before the fact to murder in the first degree. 7 ' He was con-
victed of manslaughter.7 9 The supreme court reversed.'8 °
The court held that the verdict was contrary to the evi-
dence and was in all likelihood a compromise verdict. All the
evidence presented in court pertained to murder; that is, a
crime involving malice. Because manslaughter was defined as
a killing without malice, no evidence of manslaughter was
presented. Indeed, to the extent it proved malice, it disproved
manslaughter. Because there was nothing on which the jury
could have based a finding of manslaughter, their verdict was
arbitrary:
2d 695, 697, 619 P.2d 977, 978 (1980), both accidental homicide and self-defense
instructions were given.
In another example, State v. Montague, 10 Wash. App. 911, 521 P.2d 64 (1974), a
defendant accused of burglary argued that he had consent to enter from someone
entitled to grant it, and that if that person did not have authority, he reasonably
believed that the person did have the authority. The court found that the evidence did
not support the claim of reasonable belief. However, the court found nothing wrong in
principle with instructing the jury on those two inconsistent theories of the case.
177. 12 Wash. 349, 41 P. 51 (1895).
178. Former Washington Penal Code § 1 (1891) provided as follows: "Every
person who shall purposely, and of deliberate and premeditated malice . . . kill
another, shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree, and upon conviction
thereof, shall suffer death."
179. Former Washington Penal Code § 7 (1891) provided as follows: "Every
person who shall unlawfully kill any human being without malice, express or implied,
either voluntarily upon a sudden heat, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some
unlawful act, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter."
180. Robinson, 12 Wash. at 353, 41 P. at 55.
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It was conceded by the learned counsel for the state, upon
the argument of the cause in this court, that if the informa-
tion had charged no higher offense than manslaughter the
evidence introduced would be incompetent to establish such
a crime .... Conspiring with another to kill a human being
necessarily involves malice, whereas manslaughter is the
"unlawful killing without malice," and does not admit of a
preconcerted design. The only offense which the evidence in
this case tended to establish was murder in either the first
or second degree, and the verdict which found appellant
guilty of manslaughter was farcical and "contrary to the law
and the evidence." It was the duty of the jury, if they enter-
tained a reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt of the only
crime which the evidence tended to prove, to acquit and "not
compromise with that doubt by finding him guilty of a lower
grade of offense.
18 1
Sixteen years later, the court provided a more general, and
even more compelling, statement of the rationale. In State v.
Pepoon,l s2 the defendant gave his wife poison, which caused
her death. He claimed that he had made a mistake. The State
charged him with first degree premeditated murder."8 The
defendant requested instructions on manslaughter' and sec-
ond degree murder." 5 The instructions were refused, and he
was convicted as charged.ls
The supreme court affirmed, relying principally on Robin-
son. The court acknowledged that under the legal prong, sec-
ond degree murder and manslaughter are lesser included
offenses to murder in the first degree. s7 Nevertheless, the
court reasoned that the jury could not have found the lesser
offenses:
181. Id. at 350-51, 41 P. at 51 (citations omitted).
182. 62 Wash. 635, 641, 114 P. 449, 451-52 (1911).
183. Former Rem. & Ball. Code and Statutes § 2391 (1909) provided as follows:
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the
first degree when committed... [w]ith a premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed or another; .... "
184. Former Rem. & Ball. Code and Statutes § 2395 (1909) provided as follows:
"In any case other than [first or second degree murder or killing in a duel], homicide,
not being excusable or justifiable, is manslaughter."
185. Former Rem. & Ball. Code and Statutes § 393 (1909) provided as follows:
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the
second degree when- ... [c]ommitted with a design to effect the death of the person
killed or of another, but without premeditation; ...
186. Pepoon, 62 Wash. at 639, 114 P. at 451.
187. Id. at 640, 114 P. at 451.
1992]
234 University of Puget Sound Law Review
[The jury's] determination must, of course, be based upon
evidence. That is all that gives the determination any value.
The anxiety of the law is to give the defendant the full bene-
fit of trial by jury on all questions of fact, and it will not give
its sanction to a farcical and arbitrary determination of any
alleged fact which the jury has had no possible means of
determining. If the defendant had been informed against for
manslaughter and the state had failed to produce any evi-
dence tending to show the commission of manslaughter, as it
did fail in this case to do, there would have been no duty
resting upon the jury, and it would clearly have been the
duty of the court to discharge the jury because there was
nothing upon which the function of a jury could take hold,
and to discharge the defendant. The legal function of the
jury is not at all changed because the question for determi-
nation arises upon an information in the first degree.
L88
The reason the jury could not have found manslaughter or
second degree murder was that the murder, if there was a
murder at all, was committed by poison. Murder by such
means is necessarily murder in the first degree: if death is
intended, the administration of poison requires such a degree
of deliberation and preparation that it necessarily entails
premeditation.'8 9 In other words, the evidence of the greater
offense precluded a finding that the lesser had been
committed.
This preclusion by the evidence is quite distinct from the
concept of sufficiency of the evidence. Take first degree per-
jury' 90 and false swearing,1 9 ' for example. If the evidence is
188. Id.
189. The Pepoon court reasoned as follows:
The testimony shows that the wife of appellant, whom he is charged with
murdering, was of unsound mind, and on the day of her death was in a highly
nervous condition; that either in an attempt to allay this condition, or for the
actual purpose of murdering her, the appellant, with the aid of Wilcox, who
by appellant's direction was waiting upon his wife, consulted as to where the
medicine was which they desired to administer to her; that they secured the
medicine, put it in a glass tumbler, and urged her to drink it; and that she did
drink it, and immediately went into spasms and died from the effects of it.
Under such circumstances one of two things is certain: either the potion was
administered by mistake, in which event no degree of murder was committed,
or it was administered with a premeditated, deliberate, and malicious intent to
murder. There is no room under the testimony for any other theory, and no
testimony whatever upon which any other verdict than the one rendered
could have been based. Hence, it would be farcical to reverse the judgment on
the ground complained of.
Id. at 640-41, 114 P. at 451-52.
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.020(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
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insufficient to establish any of the elements of false swearing-
knowledge of falsity for instance-that lesser offense cannot be
submitted to the jury. While true, that is not the point of the
evidence prong. If the evidence is insufficient to support an
inference of knowledge of falsity, neither the greater nor the
lesser offense can be submitted to the jury. Like all elements
of the lesser offense, knowledge of falsity is an element of both
the greater and the lesser offenses. Evidence sufficient to sup-
port a proposed instruction, 9 2 and to support the submission of
a charge to the jury,"' is generally required. If the evidence is
insufficient on an element of the lesser, it is also insufficient
on an element of the greater, and neither charge will be sub-
mitted to the jury. That is clearly different from a case in
which the evidence prong is not met, where the greater offense
will be submitted to the jury, though the lesser cannot be.
What the evidence prong really addresses is the state of
the evidence on the elements of the greater offense that are
absent from the lesser. The question is whether proof of the
elements common to both offenses also establishes the remain-
ing elements of the greater, thereby precluding a finding that
the lesser offense was committed. In both Robinson and
Pepoon, the proof of a common element, causing the death of
another, also established the remaining elements of the greater
offense. In Robinson, proof that the defendant caused the
death of another entailed proving a conspiracy, thereby estab-
lishing premeditated malice. In Pepoon, proof of the defend-
ant's causing death entailed proof of poisoning, thereby
establishing premeditated design. In both cases, a finding that
the lesser offense of manslaughter or second degree murder
had been committed was positively precluded by the evidence.
Robinson and Pepoon not only demonstrate that such pre-
clusion can occur, they indicate why it occurs. While it is possi-
ble to separate and compare the various elements of the
greater and lesser offenses as they are laid out in the books-
the focus of Workman's first prong-the acts that the statu-
guilty of perjury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he makes a materially
false statement which he knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by
law."
191. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.040(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of false swearing if he makes a false statement, which he knows to be false,
under an oath required or authorized by law."
192. State v. Hughes, 106 Wash. 2d 176, 191, 721 P.2d 902, 910 (1986).
193. State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash. 2d 346, 349-53, 729 P.2d 48, 50 (1986).
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tory elements describe cannot be separated into various parts.
Suppose, for example, that a defendant is accused of striking
his victim with an ax and is charged with second degree
assault.194 The defendant does not deny the act, but requests
an instruction on fourth degree assault. 95 The instruction
properly would be denied. It is not possible to separate the
defendant's striking the victim from his striking her with an
ax. An instruction on simple assault would be justified only if
the former act could somehow stand alone, separate from the
latter. Necessarily, it cannot. Our ability to separate, analyti-
cally, the element of assault from the element of using a
deadly weapon is a reflection of how criminal statutes are
drafted-not of the world in which crimes are committed. The
mere fact that the elements of the assault statutes can be made
to agree in a certain way cannot justify a verdict that, in fact,
simple assault was committed. As stated by the court in
Pepoon,
[t]he anxiety of the law is to give the defendant the full ben-
efit of trial by jury on all questions of fact, and it will not
give its sanction to a farcical and arbitrary determination of
any alleged fact which the jury has had no possible means of
determining.1
96
This, of course, goes a long way toward explaining the
result in Bowerman. Bowerman was not entitled to an instruc-
tion on second degree murder because, if any murder at all was
committed, it must have been murder in the first degree: hir-
ing another to kill one's victim necessarily entails premedita-
tion. Moreover, murder by hire is an aggravating factor,
raising the offense to aggravated first degree murder.'97
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.021(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting
to assault in the first degree: . .. [alssaults another with a deadly weapon ......
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.041(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault
in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults another."
196. State v. Pepoon, 62 Wash. 635, 640, 114 P. 449, 451 (1911).
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (1989) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits first
degree murder as defined by WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1)(a), as now or
hereafter amended, and one or more of the following aggravating
circumstances exist: ...
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid




Hence, the court's statement that the jury had a choice only
between acquittal or aggravated first degree murder. 9 ' Either
Bowerman suffered from diminished capacity and should be
acquitted, or she did have the capacity to intend to kill, in
which case a murder was committed. The only murder that
the jury could have found, however, was a premeditated mur-
der accompanied by aggravating circumstances. The evidence
would not support a finding of second degree murder.
Bowerman, in other words, presents a relatively straight-
forward application of the second prong of Workman. Once
its roots in Robinson and Pepoon are exposed, however,
Bowerman also demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in
Workman's version of the evidence prong. The evidence did
not simply fail to support an inference that the lesser offense
was committed. Rather, the instruction on the lesser offense
was actually precluded by the evidence. The proof of the ele-
ments that first and second degree murder have in common
(intent to kill and causing the death of another) also proved
the remaining elements of the greater offense (premeditation
and murder for hire), thereby precluding any inference that
the lesser offense was committed. Workman's "insufficiency"
formulation of the evidence prong does not describe that sort
of preclusion. The Bowerman court, relying on Workman,
consequently failed to perceive preclusion in the case before it.
Yet it is that preclusion which is special to this part of the doc-
trine of lesser included offenses, and it is that preclusion which
separates the evidence prong from the general rule against
instructions unsupported by the evidence.
B. Confusion Over Sufflciency of the Evidence and Waiver
Under Workman's Evidence Prong
The adverse consequences of Workman's formulation do
not stop with the Bowerman court's failure to articulate clearly
the preclusive effect of the evidence. Preclusion by the evi-
dence did not escape the Bowerman court's attention entirely.
The court was aware that, somehow, the only rational choice
the jury could make was between acquittal and aggravated
first degree murder. Having only Workman's overly general
evidence prong to work with, however, the court struggled to
express how that had come about. The court's vague sense
198. State v. Bowerman, 115 Wash. 2d 794, 806, 802 P.2d 116, 123 (1990).
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that the instruction was precluded led it to suggest that
Bowerman had waived her right to it.
In this respect, Bowerman is typical. Because Workman's
overly general formulation of the evidence prong does not
properly describe preclusion by the evidence, later courts con-
fronted with an instance of it have started from scratch in try-
ing to describe it. The opinions struggle to articulate what the
facts suggest: not only is the evidence insufficient to support
the instruction, but the instruction is actually precluded by-
something.199 Unfortunately, in Bowerman and elsewhere,
courts have suggested that it is the defendant himself who is
responsible, somehow, for that preclusion.2" Their explana-
tions of preclusion by the evidence are presented as a corollary
199. For example, in Pacheco the Supreme Court offered this confusing discussion:
In order for an instruction to be given there must be evidence to support that
instruction, or, as in the case of a request for an instruction on a lesser
included offense, the evidence must support an inference that the lesser crime
was committed. Here, as forcefully argued by the defendant in his brief, the
only question was one of identification, not whether robbery in the first
degree was committed. The evidence supports an instruction on robbery in
the first degree or nothing;, it does not support an instruction on robbery in
the second degree there being no question about the presence and use of a
knife.
State v. Pacheco, 107 Wash. 2d 59, 70, 726 P.2d 981, 987 (1986). The suggestions that the
instruction on the lesser offense is not available where the sole issue is identity, and
that it is not available where the facts show the greater offense "or nothing," both
appear frequently in the case law as rough formulations of preclusion by the evidence.
The "greater crime, or none at all" formulation comes from State v. Much, 156
Wash. 403, 410; 287 P. 57, 60 (1930). Much engaged in an elaborate scheme in which he
lured his female victim from Boston by corresponding with her under an assumed
name "with a view to marriage." As expected, she arrived with her life savings, which
was later found buried in Much's yard. Much's defense was identity; he claimed that
an actual person with the name he had used in the correspondence had committed the
murder. He requested an instruction on second degree murder, which was properly
refused. As the court said: "It was either murder in the first degree, or nothing." Id.
Bowerman gives a blind citation to Much, but does not state the "all or nothing" rule.
Bowerman, 115 Wash. 2d at 806, 802 P.2d at 123.
While it has the virtue of addressing the evidence rather than suggesting waiver,
the Much "all or nothing" rule still fails to articulate preclusion. Much was not enti-
tled to an instruction on second degree murder because the same evidence that estab-
lished intent to kill also established premeditation, the remaining element of the
greater offense.
The Pacheco court begins to identify the problem when it notes that there was no
question that a knife was used, but stops well short of a complete account of why that
matters. Pacheco, 107 Wash. 2d at 70, 726 P.2d at 987. See infra text accompanying
notes 224-33.
200. See Bowerman, 115 Wash. 2d at 206, 802 P.2d at 123; State v. Speece, 115
Wash. 2d 360, 363, 798 P.2d 294, 295 (1990); State v. Fowler, 114 Wash. 2d 59, 67, 785
P.2d 808, 813 (1990).
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to the evidence prong, and they almost invariably slip into sug-
gestions of waiver.
For example, in State v. Speece, 20  Division One formu-
lated the corollary as follows: "Where acceptance of the
defendant's theory of the case would necessitate acquittal
on both the charged offense and the lesser included offense,
the evidence does not support an inference that only the lesser
was committed. ' 20 2 This, of course, makes no sense. The jury's
decision cannot cause a deficiency in the evidence.
"[A]cceptance of the defendant's theory of the case" is not the
decisive factor.203 The question is not what the jury might
find, but what it can plausibly and properly be asked to find.
To say that the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on
the lesser included offense because the jury might accept her
theory of the case, improperly suggests that the defendant has
waived the instruction by asserting that defense.
The supreme court decided Speece under a different
waiver corollary.2°4 Following the rule announced a few
months before in State v. Fowler, °5 the court held that Speece
was not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction
because he had failed to come forward with evidence in sup-
port of his requested instruction 3°6 Speece had been charged
with first degree burglary under the "armed with a deadly
weapon" alternative.0 7 That allegation rested on the fact that
he had stolen two handguns in the burglary.0 8 Speece
requested a lesser included offense instruction on second
degree burglary.2°9 The supreme court held that the instruc-
201. 56 Wash. App. 412, 783 P.2d 1108 (1989).
202. Id. at 419, 738 P.2d at 1112.
203. Id
204. Speece, 115 Wash. 2d 360, 798 P.2d 294.
205. 114 Wash. 2d 59, 785 P.2d 808 (1990).
206. Speece, 115 Wash. 2d at 363, 798 P.2d at 295. See Fowler, 114 Wash. 2d at 67,
785 P.2d at 813.
207. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.020(1) (1989) provides as follows:
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a
crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in
a dwelling and if, in entering or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight
therefrom, the actor or another participant in the crime (a) is armed with a
deadly weapon ....
208. Speece, 115 Wash. 2d at 363, 798 P.2d at 295.
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.030(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a
person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a
vehicle or a dwelling."
Given that first degree burglary involves entering or remaining in a dwelling,
19921
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tion was properly refused:
Speece's defense at trial was solely that he did not commit
the burglary. The State established prima facie evidence
that the burglar took two guns. Speece in no way disputed
this evidence. Thus, there is no affirmative evidence in the
record that would support an inference that Speece was not
armed during the burglary, once the jury found that he was,
indeed, the burglar. Speece was not entitled to a lesser
included offense instruction on second degree burglary.
2 10
Once again, however, the suggestion that the defendant
was responsible for the instruction's being refused-either
because he chose identity as his defense or because he failed to
offer evidence to rebut the State's proof that he was armed-is
incorrect. Speece was not entitled to the instruction he sought,
not because he failed to present evidence in support of it, but
because no evidence could support it. The instruction was pre-
cluded in the manner peculiar to lesser included offenses. The
proof of an element that first and second degree burglary have
in common-intent to commit a crime on the premises--con-
sisted entirely of the completed theft of the guns. Conse-
quently, the proof of that common element also established an
absent element of the greater offense-being armed with a
deadly weapon-making it impossible for the jury rationally to
find that the lesser offense was committed. The problem was
not insufficient evidence of Speece's not being armed, but that
the proof on which he would have had the jury rely in finding
the lesser offense ineluctably would have carried them beyond
that offense to find that the greater had been committed.
It is possible to see, from this vantage point, how the
courts have slipped into a waiver theory. By requesting the
instruction, the defendant does indeed ask the jury to rely on
the evidence of the greater offense that the State has
presented in order to find an element of his requested lesser
offense. Under certain combinations of facts, that can be self-
contradicting: the evidence on which the defendant would
while second degree burglary involves entering or remaining in a building other than a
dwelling, the instruction must have been requested as a lesser degree offense rather
than a lesser included offense. See supra note 168. That distinction does not affect the
outcome of Speece, however, inasmuch as it pertains only to the first prong of the
analysis. The application of the evidence prong, on which Speece turns, is the same
under either the doctrine of lesser included offenses or the doctrine of lesser degree
offenses. State v. Gottstein, 111 Wash. 600, 602, 191 P. 766, 767 (1920).
210. Speece, 115 Wash. 2d at 363, 798 P.2d at 295.
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have the jury rely in finding the lesser offense will necessarily
lead them to find the greater offense was committed. The
courts have settled on a waiver theory perhaps because the
contradiction in the defendant's request is so striking.
Yet it is clear there is no waiver. First, the defendant asks
the jury to rely on the State's evidence of the greater offense
in order to find the lesser offense in every request for a lesser
included offense instruction-on such non-controversial ele-
ments as commission within the jurisdiction, for example. If
that reliance were a waiver, the instruction would never be
proper. That is not the case. The request is self-contradicting
only under certain facts; that is, only where the proof of the
common elements of the lesser and the greater also establishes
the remaining elements of the greater. Second, where there is
a contradiction in the defendant's request, it is not attributable
to anything the defendant has done or failed to do. It is due to
the particular facts of the case, and to the impossibility of sepa-
rating acts as easily as one separates abstract elements-a
problem peculiar to the doctrine of lesser included offenses.21'
C Confusion Over the Defendant's Burden of Production
Under Workman's Evidence Prong
Significantly, preclusion has nothing to do with whether
the defendant has come forward with evidence. The case of
State v. Fowler,112 on which Speece turned, arose out of a traffic
dispute in which the defendant was the aggressor and was
alleged to have drawn a handgun and pointed it at the victim,
another driver." The defendant asserted that, at most, the
victim had had a glimpse of a gun in the defendant's shoulder
holster. 4 The State charged Fowler with second degree
assault.215  He requested an instruction on the same lesser
offense at issue in Workman: unlawfully carrying a
weapon.1 6 The State conceded that the elements test was
211. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
212. 114 Wash. 2d 59, 785 P.2d 808 (1990).
213. Id. at 61, 785 P.2d at 810.
214. Id.
215. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.021(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting
to assault in the first degree: . . . [aissaults another with a deadly weapon;...
216. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.270(1) (1989) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for anyone to carry, exhibit, display or draw any firearm,
dagger, sword, knife or other cutting or stabbing instrument, club, or any
other weapon apparently capable of producing bodily harm, in a manner,
19921
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met.2 1 7 The lower court held that the evidence prong was
not.2
18
The supreme court affirmed and offered a string of non
sequiturs as its rationale:
Fowler did not offer evidence at trial which would support a
theory he intended to intimidate the Verbons with his gun
or that he displayed his gun in a manner which would cause
the Verbons alarm. Instead, his testimony only addressed
whether he had a gun at all, and if he did, whether it would
have been visible as he began to remove his shirt. This testi-
mony served merely to discredit the Verbons' testimony
rather than support an instruction on the lesser included
offense. It is not enough that the jury might simply disbe-
lieve the State's evidence. Instead, some evidence must be
presented which affirmatively establishes the defendant's
theory on the lesser included offense before an instruction
will be given.2
19
This clearly has nothing to do with preclusion. The court
assumes that the evidence prong concerns sufficiency of the
evidence, and it then elaborates on that assumption using a
flawed waiver theory. Not only must there be a certain
amount of evidence, but the defendant must produce a certain
portion of it. Just as the defendant can disavow his right to an
instruction by choosing a particular defense, he can waive it by
failing to come forward with evidence. The only problem with
these corollaries to Workman's second prong is that they have
nothing to do with Robinson, Pepoon, or the preclusion that is
unique to the doctrine of lesser included offenses.
Even more importantly, the Fowler court's analysis is an
odd sort of appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.
When appellate courts do properly examine sufficiency of the
evidence, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Furthermore, the question is not how
the court would decide the issue, but whether the jury could
rationally reach its conclusion. 220 These requirements are fun-
under circumstances, and at a time and place that either manifests an intent
to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.
217. Fowler, 114 Wash. 2d at 67, 785 P.2d at 813.
218. Id.
219. Id. (citations omitted).
220. As the court held in State v. Green, 94 Wash. 2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628, 632
(1980) (Green II) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original):
This inquiry does not require the reviewing court to determine whether it
believes the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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damental because they frame a test of minimal rationality that
guards against invasion of the jury's province to weigh the evi-
dence and to arrive at its own conclusion. The same deference
is due the jury in the context of lesser included offenses:
Inasmuch, then, as the law gives the defendant the unquali-
fied right to have the inferior degree passed upon by the
jury, it is not within the province of the court to say that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the refusal of the court to
submit that phase of the case to the jury, or to speculate
upon probable results in the absence of such instructions. If
there is even the slightest evidence that the defendant may
have committed the degree of the offense inferior to and
included in the one charged, the law of such inferior degree
ought to be given.2
2 '
These limitations were disregarded in Fowler. If the State
happens to produce evidence in support of the lesser offense,
but the defendant does not, Fowler's requirement deprives the
jury of a legitimate inference from the evidence it has before
it. That, however, is an invasion of the jury's province to
determine the case on a complete and accurate understanding
of the law.
That, of course, was the hazard inherent in treating the
evidence prong as a sufficiency of the evidence test. From the
moment the court lost sight of preclusion and began to treat
the evidence prong as something it is not, it was always free to
disregard the restraints imposed on true sufficiency tests. In
Fowler, the court did so.
Furthermore, Fowler's burden of coming forward with evi-
dence runs contrary to the underlying logic of the doctrine of
lesser included offenses. By making the instruction unavaila-
ble even where there is evidence to support it, Fowler's
requirement increases the danger that a jury, faced with evi-
dence of wrongdoing that is not quite sufficient to prove the
offense charged, will nevertheless opt for conviction. This dan-
ger is the primary reason why lesser included offense instruc-
tions are available to the defense.222 By disregarding this
"Instead the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
The criterion impinges upon a jury's discretion only to the extent necessary to protect
the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt.
221. State v. Young, 22 Wash. 273, 276-77, 60 P. 650, 651 (1900) (citations omitted).
222. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973).
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danger, the Fowler court effectively repudiated decades of
received wisdom on the subject.
Fowler's focus on the defendant's production of evidence is
an example of the court's mistaking a symptom for the disease.
If there is any evidence in support of the common elements
that does not also establish the elements of the greater offense,
that evidence is indeed most likely to come from the defend-
ant. It is in his interest and often solely within his power to do
so. By imposing a burden of coming forward with evidence,
however, the Fowler court confused the effect of the evidence
with its source. The court assumed that if the defendant did
not come forward with evidence, there would be no evidence in
support of the common elements that would not also establish
the elements of the greater. That assumption is unwarranted.
It is entirely possible that the State's case will include evidence
that establishes the lesser offense but not the greater. There is
no reason, given the general presumption in favor of giving the
instruction, why the defendant should be denied the right to
ask the jury to find the lesser offense so long as there is some
evidence, from whatever source, upon which it rationally could
do so. 223 After Fowler, however, there was almost no hope that
the court would recognize preclusion by the evidence, even in a
case as clear as Speece.
D. Reformulating the Evidence Prong
Having gone so far astray, it is now time for the Washing-
ton Supreme Court to return to a true understanding of the
evidence prong. It should abandon Workman's overly general
requirement that the evidence support an inference that the
lesser offense was committed. It should discard the corollaries
like Fowler's, which focus on the quantity of evidence, and
those like Bowerman's, which suggest that the defendant can
somehow waive his right to a lesser included offense instruc-
tion. The court must adopt a standard properly premised on
the type of preclusion by the evidence that is distinctive to
lesser included offense analysis.
So far, this Article has employed the following formula:
does the proof of the elements that the greater and lesser
offenses have in common prove the absent elements of the
greater offense? If the answer is yes, the instruction on the
223. This was once well recognized. See State v. Gottstein, 111 Wash. 600, 602, 191
P. 766, 767 (1920).
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lesser offense is precluded. The jury could not rationally find
the lesser offense was committed because the same evidence
they would rely on in finding the lesser offense will inexorably
carry them beyond it to a finding that the greater offense was
committed.
Some refinements and clarifications are needed, however,
before this test can be considered an effective evidence prong.
To begin with, Workman framed the standard for lesser
included offenses as two conditions that must be met in order
to justify the instruction. The refinement of the first prong
developed in Section III of this Article incorporates the inher-
ent characteristic rule into the elements test, but otherwise
retains Workman's formulation. For the sake of consistency
and clarity, then, it is best to also frame the evidence prong as
a condition that must be met in order to justify the instruction.
The following is probably the most clear: An instruction on
the lesser included offense may be given only if, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the
instruction, there is some evidence in support of the common
elements of the greater and lesser offenses that does not also
establish the remaining elements of the greater offense.
One point may need clarification. The evidence must be
construed in favor of the party requesting the instruction
because the law must err on the side of giving the instruction.
Instructions on lesser included offenses are made available not
only to give each side a fall-back strategy in the trial of the
case, but also to ensure a close fit between the criminal code
and the world in which crimes are committed. There is, there-
fore, a general presumption in favor of giving the instruction.
The only limitation on that presumption is identified by
Robinson: the need to avoid outright jury compromise or spec-
ulation. If, therefore, construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the requesting party, there is any evidence upon
which the jury rationally could find that the lesser, but not the
greater, offense was committed, the instruction ought to be
given.
The case of State v. Pacheco 224 can be used to illustrate the
proposed evidence prong. Pacheco robbed a grocery store.225
He used a knife.226 The robbery was videotaped, and the knife
224. 107 Wash. 2d 59, 726 P.2d 981 (1986).
225. Id. at 61, 726 P.2d at 982.
226. Id
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was plainly visible.2 2 7 Pacheco was charged with first degree
robbery under the deadly weapon alternative. 22 He requested
instructions on second degree robbery, which is identical to
first degree robbery without the deadly weapon element,229
and on unlawfully carrying a weapon. 3 ° The instructions were
properly refused.23'
The reason the instructions were properly refused is clear
from the test proposed above. The jury could not rationally
find that second degree robbery had been committed. The evi-
dence that would have established the common elements of
first and second degree robbery-the taking of property from a
person or in his presence by the use or threatened use of
force-was the videotape. That evidence of the common ele-
ments, however, also established the remaining element of the
greater offense: the use of a deadly weapon. It was not possi-
ble to separate the threatened use of force from the use of a
knife. The jury was precluded from finding the lesser offense
had been committed.
Likewise, the jury could not have found Pacheco guilty of
unlawfully carrying a weapon. The only evidence demonstrat-
ing that Pacheco had carried a knife also showed that he had
227. Id. at 61-62, 726 P.2d at 982-83.
228. Robbery is defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.190 (1989) as follows:
A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from
the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or
threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or
his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be
used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome
resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is
immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that,
although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person
from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear.
Robbery in the first degree is defined in WAH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.200(1) (1989) as
follows:
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if in the commission of a rob-
bery or of immediate flight therefrom, he:
(a) is armed with a deadly weapon; or
(b) displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon; or
(c) inflicts bodily injury.
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.210(1) (1989) provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of robbery in the second degree if he commits robbery."
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.270(1) (1989) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for anyone to carry, exhibit, display or draw any firearm,
dagger, sword, knife or other cutting or stabbing instrument, club, or any
other weapon apparently capable of producing bodily harm, in a manner,
under circumstances, and at a time and place that either manifests an intent
to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.
231. Pacheco, 107 Wash. 2d at 70, 726 P.2d at 987.
Lesser Included Offenses
committed a robbery with it. Because the proof of the common
elements also proved the remaining element of the greater
offense, the jury could not rationally have found that the
lesser offense was committed.
In articulating this sort of preclusion, the proposed evi-
dence prong is clearly superior to Workman's formulation. It
addresses the distinctive danger to rational jury verdicts that
lesser included offense analysis presents. In a sense, the evi-
dence prong is a cure for the elements prong. No one would
ever request an instruction that the evidence does not support
were it not for the specious objection with which this discus-
sion began: If the defendant necessarily committed the ele-
ments of the lesser in the course of committing the greater
offense, it seems the evidence must always be sufficient to sup-
port an instruction on the lesser. As Robinson demonstrated,
however, the mere comparison of elements raises a danger of
compromise verdicts.3 2 There must be an inquiry beyond com-
paring the elements of the offenses, i.e., something to tie that
inquiry to the real world in which bad acts and the means by
which they are accomplished are inseparable. As Pepoon
stressed, the mere comparison of elements is an abstraction,
and a jury verdict based on that alone, without regard to the
evidence, cannot be just.2 33
The proposed rule provides that inquiry without duplicat-
ing the general requirement that there be sufficient evidence
to support the instruction, and without suggesting that the
defendant, in his choice of defense or otherwise, has waived
the right to draw out the implications of the State's case.
V. CONCLUSION
It is no light matter to suggest that the Washington
Supreme Court ought to abandon a legal standard that has
been in use for over a decade. This Article has demonstrated,
however, that the Workman standard for lesser included
offenses is hemmed in on all sides by error. The cases before
Workman were misunderstood and misrepresented in the for-
mulation of the evidence prong. The cases after Workman
have failed to appreciate the elements prong or to capitalize on
the promise represented by the inherent characteristic rule.
Reform is, if anything, overdue.
232. State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, 350-51, 41 P. 51, 51 (1895).
233. State v. Pepoon, 62 Wash. 635, 640, 114 P. 449, 451 (1911).
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The reform proposed here is a replacement of Work-
man's formulation of the two prong test. The proposed first
prong consists of the elements test as stated by Workman,
with the addition of the inherent characteristic rule. The sec-
ond prong is a complete re-statement of the evidence prong
derived above. The proposed standard provides as follows: An
instruction on a lesser included offense is proper where two
conditions are met. First, a lesser offense is a lesser included
offense if each element of the lesser offense is either an ele-
ment or an inherent characteristic of the greater offense. Sec-
ond, an instruction on the lesser included offense may be
given only if, construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party requesting the instruction, there is some
evidence in support of the common elements of the greater and
lesser offenses that does not also establish the remaining ele-
ments of the greater offense.
Because it heeds the meaning of the early cases, this pro-
posed standard would serve the courts and the criminal law
bar, the defense and the prosecution, as well as the criminal
code and justice itself, far better than the present law.
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